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Abstract
Public-key cryptography is a key technology for making the Internet and other
IT infrastructures secure. The security of the established public-key cryptosys-
tems relies on the diﬃculty of factoring large composite integers or computing
discrete logarithms. However, it is unclear whether these computational prob-
lems remain intractable in the future. For example, Shor showed in 1994 [71]
that quantum computers can be used to factor integers and to compute discrete
logarithms in polynomial time. It is therefore necessary to develop alternative
public-key cryptosystems which do not rely on the diﬃculty of factoring or com-
puting discrete logarithms and which are secure even against quantum computer
attacks. We call such cryptosystems quantum-immune.
To prove the security of these quantum-immune cryptosystems, appropriate
security models have to be used. Since quantum computers are able to solve
problems in polynomial time which are supposed to be intractable for classi-
cal computers, the existing security models are inadequate in the presence of
quantum adversaries. Therefore, new security models have to be developed to
capture quantum adversaries. Properties of these new security models have to
be investigated.
On a more practical level, the quantum-immune cryptosystems have to
be implemented in a way that they can seamlessly replace established cryp-
tosystems. The implementations have to be eﬃcient and suitable for resource-
constrained devices. They must easily integrate into existing public-key infra-
structures.
This thesis contributes to both the theory and practice of quantum-immune
cryptography, addressing the above-mentioned challenges. In the theoretical
part, we concentrate on the quantum zero-knowledge property of interactive
proof systems. We show for the ﬁrst time that the quantum statistical, perfect,
and computational zero-knowledge properties are preserved under sequential
composition of interactive proof systems.
In the practical part, we provide implementations of the most important
quantum-immune cryptosystems. We present eﬃciency improvements of some
of the alternative cryptosystems. The implementations are very eﬃcient and
easily integrate into existing public-key infrastructures. We present compre-
hensive timings that show that the alternative cryptosystems are competitive
or even superior compared to established cryptosystems. Finally, we present a
new cryptographic API that is particularly well-suited for resource-constrained
devices like mobile phones and PDAs. With this API, the alternative cryptosys-
tems can also be used with these devices.
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Zusammenfassung
Public-Key-Kryptograﬁe ist eine Schlüsseltechnologie zur Absicherung des In-
ternets und anderer IT-Infrastrukturen. Die Sicherheit etablierter Public-Key-
Kryptoverfahren beruht auf der Schwierigkeit des Faktorisierens großer Zahlen
oder des Berechnens diskreter Logarithmen. Es ist jedoch unklar, ob diese Pro-
bleme auch zukünftig schwer lösbar bleiben. Beispielsweise zeigte Shor 1994
[71], dass Quanten-Computer in der Lage sind, in Polynomialzeit große Zahlen
zu faktorisieren und diskrete Logarithmen zu berechnen. Deshalb müssen alter-
native Public-Key-Kryptoverfahren entwickelt werden, deren Sicherheit nicht
auf der Schwierigkeit des Faktorisierens oder des Berechnens diskreter Loga-
rithmen beruht, und die sicher selbst gegen Angriﬀe durch Quantencomputer
sind. Derartige Kryptoverfahren bezeichnen wir als quanten-immun.
Um die Sicherheit solcher quanten-immuner Kryptoverfahren zu beweisen,
müssen geeignete Sicherheitsmodelle verwendet werden. Da Quantencomputer
in der Lage sind, Probleme in Polynomialzeit zu lösen, die unlösbar (intractable)
für klassische Computer sind, sind die existierenden Sicherheitsmodelle unge-
eignet, die Sicherheit gegen Quanten-Angreifer zu erfassen. Daher müssen neue
Sicherheitsmodelle entwickelt werden. Eigenschaften dieser neuen Sicherheits-
modelle müssen untersucht werden.
Von der praktischen Ebene betrachtet, müssen die quanten-immunen Kryp-
toverfahren so implementiert werden, dass sie die etablierten Verfahren naht-
los ersetzen können. Die Implementierungen müssen eﬃzient und geeignet für
ressourcenbeschränkte Endgeräte sein. Sie müssen leicht in bestehende Public-
Key-Infrastrukturen integriert werden können.
Diese Arbeit trägt sowohl zur Theorie als auch zur Praxis von quanten-
immuner Kryptograﬁe bei. Sie adressiert dabei die oben genannten Heraus-
forderungen.
Im theoretischen Teil konzentrieren wir uns auf die Quanten-zero-know-
ledge-Eigenschaft interaktiver Beweissysteme. Wir zeigen erstmalig, dass die
Quanten-statistical, -perfect und -computational zero-knowledge-Eigenschaften
robust sind unter sequentieller Komposition interaktiver Beweissysteme.
Im praktischen Teil stellen wir Implementierungen der wichtigsten quan-
ten-immunen Kryptoverfahren vor. Für einige der Verfahren entwickeln wir
Algorithmen zur Steigerung der Eﬃzienz. Die Implementierungen sind sehr
eﬃzient und lassen sich leicht in bestehende Public-Key-Infrastrukturen integri-
eren. Wir präsentieren umfassende Zeitmessungen, die zeigen, dass die alterna-
tiven Kryptoverfahren vergleichbar mit etablierten Kryptoverfahren oder diesen
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sogar überlegen sind. Zuletzt stellen wir eine neue API für kryptograﬁsche Ver-
fahren vor, die besonders geeignet ist für den Einsatz auf ressourcenbeschränkten
Endgeräten wie Mobiltelefonen und PDAs. Mit dieser API ist es möglich, die
alternativen Kryptoverfahren auch auf diesen Endgeräten einzusetzen.
IV
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public-key cryptography is a key technology for making the Internet and other
IT infrastructures secure. Digital signatures provide authenticity, integrity, and
support for non-repudiation of data. They are widely used in identiﬁcation and
authentication protocols, for example for software downloads. Public-key en-
cryption is used to achieve conﬁdentiality, for example in the SSL/TLS protocol
[56, 37]. Therefore, secure public-key cryptosystems are crucial for maintaining
IT security.
Resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones and PDAs are increas-
ingly used for applications such as mobile commerce and online banking services.
These applications have many security requirements which can be satisﬁed by
using public-key cryptography. Consequently, it is desirable to have secure
public-key cryptosystems also for these devices.
Digital signature schemes commonly used today are RSA [64], DSA [53],
and ECDSA [2, 39]. Commonly used public-key encryption schemes are RSA
[64], ElGamal [19], and ECIES [40].
The security of those cryptosystems relies on the diﬃculty of factoring large
composite integers or computing discrete logarithms. However, it is unclear
whether these computational problems remain intractable in the future.
Quantum Turing Machines were ﬁrst considered in 1985 by Deutsch [14], and
considerably improved in 1997 by Bernstein and Vazirani [7]. In 1994, Shor [71]
showed that quantum computers can be used to factor integers and to compute
discrete logarithms in polynomial time. In 2001, Chuang et al. [78] implemented
Shor's algorithm on a 7-qubit quantum computer. Physicists predict that large-
scale quantum computers may be available in the next 15 to 20 years. Also,
in the past 30 years, there has been signiﬁcant progress in solving the integer
factorization and discrete logarithm problems using classical computers [46, 47,
11, 3].
It is therefore necessary to develop alternative public-key cryptosystems
which do not rely on the diﬃculty of factoring or computing discrete loga-
rithms, and which are secure even against quantum computer attacks. We call
such public-key cryptosystems quantum-immune.
There already exist a number of promising candidates for such quantum-
immune cryptosystems. CMSS [8, 13] is a digital signature scheme whose se-
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curity is based on the existence of cryptographic hash functions. The security
of the NTRU encryption scheme [32, 33, 34, 35] relies on the hardness of cer-
tain lattice problems. The McEliece public-key cryptosystem (PKCS) [48] and
its variants [44, 59, 23] are encryption schemes whose security is based on the
diﬃculty of certain classical coding-theoretical problems.
To prove the security of these alternative cryptosystems, appropriate secu-
rity models have to be used. Classical security models have already been studied
extensively. Most of these security models are based on the idea of computa-
tional security. Adversaries are modelled as polynomial-time classical Turing
machines, and security is deﬁned with respect to such adversaries.
Since quantum computers are able to solve problems in polynomial time
which are supposed to be intractable for classical computers, the existing se-
curity models are inadequate in the presence of quantum adversaries. There-
fore, new security models have to be developed to capture quantum adversaries.
Properties of these new security models have to be investigated.
On a more practical level, the alternative cryptosystems have to be imple-
mented in a way that they can seamlessly replace established cryptosystems.
The implementations have to be eﬃcient and suitable for resource-constrained
devices. They must easily integrate into existing public-key infrastructures.
Results and structure of the thesis
This thesis contributes to both the theory and practice of quantum-immune
cryptography, addressing the above-mentioned challenges. In the following, we
brieﬂy describe the results contained in each chapter. We give a short motivation
and some background of the results. More detailed introductions, including
further references, are given at the beginning of each chapter.
Chapter 2 is concerned with security models for quantum-immune cryptog-
raphy. Speciﬁcally, we treat in depth the quantum zero-knowledge property of
interactive proof systems. We show for the ﬁrst time that the quantum statisti-
cal, perfect, and computational zero-knowledge properties are preserved under
sequential composition of interactive proof systems.
Classical interactive proof systems and the zero-knowledge property have
ﬁrst been deﬁned in 1985 by Goldreich, Micali, and Rackoﬀ in [30], and have
been studied extensively since. Zero-knowledge proof systems are interesting
from both a complexity-theoretical and a cryptographical point of view.
There exist zero-knowledge proof systems for a variety of interesting prob-
lems. Some of these problems are not known to be computable in polynomial
time [27, 30, 66, 29, 24]. Under certain assumptions, zero-knowledge proof sys-
tems exist for any language in NP [27]. There even exist zero-knowledge proof
systems for problems not known to be in NP [27, 51].
Zero-knowledge interactive proof systems are also used as a tool for building
other cryptographic protocols. Identiﬁcation schemes are a direct application.
There exist zero-knowledge identiﬁcation schemes based on a variety of problems
[21, 67, 69, 60, 65, 74, 51]. Also, zero-knowledge proof systems are used as sub-
protocols in larger protocols to allow one party to prove to another that it
behaved correctly in the protocol [26].
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Quantum interactive proof systems and the quantum zero-knowledge prop-
erty against honest veriﬁers were ﬁrst deﬁned in 2002 by Watrous in [79]. The
general deﬁnition of the quantum zero-knowledge property was given by Wa-
trous in his seminal paper [81].
Sequential composition is used to reduce the completeness and soundness
errors of interactive proof systems. For zero-knowledge proof systems, it is
desired that the zero-knowledge property is preserved under such sequential
compositions. Moreover, when zero-knowledge proof systems are used as sub-
protocols in larger protocols, one also wants the zero-knowledge property to be
preserved.
In [28], Goldreich and Oren showed the robustness of the classical auxiliary
input zero-knowledge property under sequential composition. It is expected
[81] that the quantum zero-knowledge property is also robust under sequential
composition, but no proof has yet appeared in the literature.
We show that the quantum statistical, perfect, and computational zero-
knowledge properties are preserved under sequential composition of interactive
proof systems. The mathematical foundation of the proofs is completely diﬀer-
ent from the classical case, although the concepts are related. The proofs for the
quantum statistical and perfect zero-knowledge cases turn out to be structurally
similar, while the proof for the quantum computational zero-knowledge case is
conceptually diﬀerent. We give detailed proofs of the results, providing all the
necessary mathematical background. The results described in this chapter are
joint work with Johannes Buchmann.
In the following three chapters, contributions concerning the most important
existing quantum-immune cryptosystems are presented.
In Chapter 3, we describe CMSS [8, 13], a digital signature scheme which is
based on the Merkle signature scheme (MSS) [50]. The security of CMSS relies
on the existence of cryptographic hash functions. CMSS was ﬁrst deﬁned in the
PhD thesis of Coronado [13] and incorporates the improvements of MSS from
[77, 17]. The chapter is based on joint work with Johannes Buchmann, Luis
Carlos Coronado García, Erik Dahmen, and Elena Klintsevich.
In Chapter 4, we present improvements of the eﬃciency of the NTRU en-
cryption scheme [32, 33, 34, 35]. The security of the NTRU encryption scheme is
based on the hardness of certain lattice problems. We propose a new algorithm
for the fast multiplication of NTRU polynomials. The proposed algorithm is
between 11% and 23% faster on average than the best currently known method,
which is the sliding window method of Lee et al. [45]. The new multiplication
algorithm is joint work with Johannes Buchmann and Richard Lindner.
In Chapter 5, we describe the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS [44]. This cryp-
tosystem is a variant of the McEliece PKCS [48] which is secure against adap-
tive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2 secure). Compared to other CCA2 secure
variants of the McEliece PKCS [59, 23], the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS oﬀers
the best information rate (i.e., the ratio between the plaintext and ciphertext
size). The security of the McEliece PKCS and its CCA2 secure variants relies on
the hardness of certain classical coding theoretical problems. We show how to
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modify the original McEliece PKCS to achieve signiﬁcantly reduced key sizes.
This idea was ﬁrst described in [20]. Based on a collaboration with Raphael
Overbeck, we also describe how to speed up the decoding algorithm for Goppa
codes.
We present highly eﬃcient Java implementations of all these cryptosystems.
Detailed descriptions of the algorithms and data structures are provided. The
implementations can easily be integrated into existing public-key infrastruc-
tures and are suitable for resource-constrained devices. We provide comprehen-
sive timings of the implementations. Based on these timings, we compare the
implementations with established cryptosystems. It is shown that the quantum-
immune cryptosystems oﬀer competitive or even superior timings compared to
established cryptosystems.
Finally, in Chapter 6, contributions to the provision of cryptography specif-
ically for resource-constrained devices are described. We present a new ﬂexible
API for cryptographic services which is suitable for these devices. We compare
the new API with the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA), the cryptographic
framework provided by the Java platform. The new API is already used by the
cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22] and by a full-ﬂedged cryptographic ap-
plication [42]. The results described in this chapter are joint work with Johannes
Buchmann.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and gives an outlook by discussing open
problems and possible future work.
4
Chapter 2
Sequential composition of
quantum zero-knowledge proof
systems
Classical interactive proof systems and the zero-knowledge property have ﬁrst
been deﬁned in 1985 by Goldreich, Micali, and Rackoﬀ in [30], and have been
studied extensively since. Zero-knowledge proof systems are interesting from a
complexity theoretical point of view: there exist zero-knowledge proof systems
for a variety of problems not known to be computable in polynomial time such
as Graph Isomorphism [27], Quadratic Residuosity [30], Statistical Diﬀerence
[66], Entropy Diﬀerence [29], and various lattice problems [24]. Under certain
cryptographic assumptions, zero-knowledge proof systems exist for any language
in NP [27]. There even exist zero-knowledge proof systems for problems not
known to be in NP such as Graph Non-Isomorphism [27] and approximate
versions of the Shortest Vector and Closest Vector problems in lattices [51].
Zero-knowledge interactive proof systems are also used as a tool for building
other cryptographic protocols. Identiﬁcation schemes are a direct application.
There exist zero-knowledge identiﬁcation schemes based on a variety of problems
such as Integer Factorization [21], Discrete Logarithms [67], Permuted Kernels
[69], Permuted Perceptons [60], Permuted Patterns [65], Syndrome Decoding
[74], lattice problems [51], and many more. Also, zero-knowledge proof systems
are used as sub-protocols in larger protocols to allow one party to prove to
another that it behaved correctly in the protocol [26].
Quantum interactive proof systems and the quantum zero-knowledge prop-
erty against honest veriﬁers were ﬁrst deﬁned in 2002 by Watrous in [79]. The
general deﬁnition of the quantum zero-knowledge property was given by Wa-
trous in his seminal paper [81]. There, it is shown for the ﬁrst time that certain
classical zero-knowledge proof systems (such as the one for the Graph Isomor-
phism problem) also are zero-knowledge against quantum veriﬁers. Also, it is
shown that under certain cryptographic assumptions, quantum zero-knowledge
proof systems exist for any language in NP.
The general deﬁnition of the quantum zero-knowledge property uses a more
modern quantum formalism (based on admissible super-operators) than the def-
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inition given in [79]. For a survey of this quantum formalism, see e.g. [43] and
[80].
Interactive proof systems have two central properties: completeness and
soundness. Informally, completeness means that an honest prover causes the
honest veriﬁer to accept the interaction with high probability. Soundness means
that a cheating prover will be detected by the honest veriﬁer with high proba-
bility. Generally, it is desired that the completeness and soundness errors are
exponentially small. If they are not, sequential composition of the proof system
can be used to reduce these errors exponentially quickly. For zero-knowledge
proof systems, it is desired that the zero-knowledge property is preserved un-
der such sequential compositions. Also, when zero-knowledge proof systems are
used as sub-protocols in larger protocols, the zero-knowledge property shall also
be preserved.
In [25], Goldreich and Krawczyk showed that the original deﬁnition of the
zero-knowledge property for classical interactive proof systems is not robust un-
der sequential composition. In [28], Goldreich and Oren extended the deﬁnition
to the notion of auxiliary input zero-knowledge and showed the robustness of
the new deﬁnition under sequential composition. This robustness is also known
as the Sequential Composition Lemma. It is expected [81] that the quantum
zero-knowledge property is also robust under sequential composition, but no
proof has yet appeared in the literature.
In this chapter, we show that the quantum statistical, perfect, and computa-
tional zero-knowledge properties are preserved under sequential composition of
interactive proof systems.1 We provide detailed proofs of the results. The math-
ematical foundation of the proofs is completely diﬀerent from the classical case,
although the concepts are related. The proofs for the quantum statistical and
perfect zero-knowledge cases are similar, while the proof for the quantum com-
putational zero-knowledge case is conceptually diﬀerent. We provide detailed
mathematical background needed to understand the proofs.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.1, we provide the necessary
mathematical background. In Section 2.2, we review interactive proof systems
and the quantum zero-knowledge property. We also deﬁne the sequential com-
position of interactive proof systems. In Section 2.3, we prove the robustness of
the quantum statistical, perfect, and computational zero-knowledge properties
under sequential composition.
2.1 Mathematical background
In this section, we provide the mathematical background needed to understand
later sections. We review the deﬁnition and basic properties of linear operators
and operator norms. The stated deﬁnitions and facts are taken from [1] and
[80]. For clariﬁcation and convenience, we provide details of some of the proofs.
For given complex Euclidean vector spaces X and Y, the set of all linear
operators from X to Y is denoted L(X ,Y). We use L(X ) as shorthand for
L(X ,X ). The set of all linear isometries from X to Y is denoted U(X ,Y). The
1The results described in this chapter have been submitted to SIAM Journal on Computing.
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inner product of two operators A,B ∈ L(X ,Y) is deﬁned as 〈A,B〉 = Tr(A∗B),
where Tr(.) is the trace function. A linear super-operator (or simply a super-
operator) is a linear mapping from L(X ) to L(Y) for complex Euclidean spaces
X and Y. The set of all such super-operators is denoted T(X ,Y). With the
usual pointwise addition and scalar multiplication of super-operators, this set is
itself a linear space. A super-operator is said to be admissible if it is completely
positive and trace-preserving.
We deﬁne the operator norm and trace norm of linear operators and review
some basic properties of these norms.
Deﬁnition 1 (Operator norms)
Let X , Y be complex Euclidean spaces and A ∈ L(X ,Y) be a linear operator.
The operator or spectral norm of A is deﬁned as
‖A‖ = max {‖Ax‖ : x ∈ X , ‖x‖ ≤ 1} .
The trace norm of A is deﬁned as
‖A‖tr = Tr
√
A∗A.
The operator norm and trace norm of a linear operator can be characterized
as follows:
Fact 1 For all linear operators A ∈ L(X ,Y), it holds that
‖A‖ = max {|〈A,B〉| : B ∈ L(X ,Y), ‖B‖tr ≤ 1}
and
‖A‖tr = max {|〈A,B〉| : B ∈ L(X ,Y), ‖B‖ ≤ 1} .
The operator and trace norms of linear operators are submultiplicative:
Fact 2 For all linear operators A ∈ L(Y,Z), B ∈ L(X ,Y), it holds that
‖AB‖ ≤ ‖A‖ ‖B‖
and
‖AB‖tr ≤ ‖A‖tr ‖B‖tr .
The operator and trace norms of linear operators are multiplicative with
respect to tensor products:
Fact 3 For all linear operators A ∈ L(X1,Y1), B ∈ L(X2,Y2), it holds that
‖A⊗B‖ = ‖A‖ ‖B‖
and
‖A⊗B‖tr = ‖A‖tr ‖B‖tr .
The operator trace norm is monotonic with respect to partial traces and
unitarily invariant:
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Fact 4 For all linear operators A ∈ L(X ⊗ Y), it holds that
‖TrYA‖tr ≤ ‖A‖tr ,
where TrY denotes the partial trace.
Fact 5 For all linear operators A ∈ L(X ) and all linear isometries U, V ∈
U(X ,Y), it holds that
‖V AU∗‖tr = ‖A‖tr .
We deﬁne the super-operator trace norm and diamond norm:
Deﬁnition 2 (Super-operator norms)
Let X , Y be complex Euclidean spaces and Φ ∈ T(X ,Y) be an arbitrary super-
operator. The trace norm of Φ is deﬁned as
‖Φ‖tr = max {‖Φ(X)‖tr : X ∈ L(X ), ‖X‖tr ≤ 1} .
The diamond norm of Φ is deﬁned as
‖Φ‖ = sup
{∥∥Φ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr : Z is a complex Euclidean space} .
As the super-operator trace norm is induced by the operator trace-norm, it
is also submultiplicative and multiplicative with respect to tensor products:
Fact 6 For all super-operators Φ ∈ T(Y,Z) and Ψ ∈ T(X ,Y), it holds that
‖ΦΨ‖tr ≤ ‖Φ‖tr ‖Ψ‖tr .
Fact 7 For all super-operators Φ ∈ T(X1,Y1) and Ψ ∈ T(X2,Y2), it holds that
‖Φ⊗Ψ‖tr = ‖Φ‖tr ‖Ψ‖tr .
The super-operator diamond norm can be characterized in terms of the
super-operator trace-norm:
Fact 8 For all super-operators Φ ∈ T(X ,Y) and any complex Euclidean space
Z with dimZ ≥ dimX , it holds that
‖Φ‖ =
∥∥Φ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr .
Using Fact 8, we establish the submultiplicativity of the super-operator di-
amond norm:
Lemma 1 For all super-operators Φ ∈ T(Y,Z) and Ψ ∈ T(X ,Y), it holds that
‖ΦΨ‖ ≤ ‖Φ‖‖Ψ‖.
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Proof Choose a complex Euclidean space Z with dimZ ≥ max(dimX ,dimY).
By Fact 8, it holds that
‖ΦΨ‖ =
∥∥ΦΨ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr .
Furthermore,∥∥ΦΨ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr = ∥∥(Φ⊗ IL(Z))(Ψ⊗ IL(Z))∥∥tr
≤
Fact 6
∥∥Φ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr ∥∥Ψ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr
=
Fact 8
‖Φ‖‖Ψ‖.
Deﬁnition 3 (Adjoint super-operator)
Let Φ ∈ T(X ,Y) be a super-operator. The adjoint super-operator (or simply
the adjoint) of Φ is deﬁned as the operator Φ∗ ∈ T(Y,X ) satisfying
〈Φ∗(B), A〉 = 〈B,Φ(A)〉
for all A ∈ L(X ) and B ∈ L(Y) (note that the inner product on the left hand
side of the equation is in L(X ) and the inner product on the right hand side is
in L(Y)).
Fact 9 (Stinespring representation)
For all admissible super-operators Φ ∈ T(X ,Y), there exists a complex Euclidean
space Z with dimZ ≤ dimX dimY and a linear isometry A ∈ U(X ,Y⊗Z) such
that for all X ∈ L(X ),
Φ(X) = TrZ(AXA∗).
We conclude the section by proving an important property of the diamond
norm of admissible super-operators:
Lemma 2 For all admissible super-operators Φ ∈ T(X ,Y), it holds that
‖Φ‖ = 1.
Proof Let TrZ(A . A∗) denote the Stinespring representation of Φ (see Fact 9)
for a complex Euclidean space Z with dimZ ≥ dimX . Then it holds that
‖Φ‖ =
Fact 8
∥∥Φ⊗ IL(Z)∥∥tr
=
Fact 7
‖Φ‖tr
∥∥IL(Z)∥∥tr
=
Def. 2
max {‖Φ(X)‖tr : X ∈ L(X ), ‖X‖tr ≤ 1}
=
Stinespring
max {‖TrZAXA∗‖tr : X ∈ L(X ), ‖X‖tr ≤ 1}
≤
Fact 4
max {‖AXA∗‖tr : X ∈ L(X ), ‖X‖tr ≤ 1}
=
Fact 5
max {‖X‖tr : X ∈ L(X ), ‖X‖tr ≤ 1}
= 1.
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To prove the reverse inequality, let ρ ∈ L(X ) be a density operator. Since
admissible super-operators map density operators to density operators and the
trace norm of density operators is 1, we have
‖Φ‖ ≥ ‖Φ(ρ)‖tr = 1,
which completes the proof.
2.2 Interactive proof systems and the quantum zero-
knowledge property
In this section, we deﬁne interactive proof systems and the quantum zero-
knowledge property. The deﬁnitions are taken from [81]. We follow the notation
established there.
2.2.1 Quantum circuits and algorithms
The quantum circuits referenced in this chapter are quantum circuits with mixed
states as deﬁned in [1]. The size of a quantum circuit is the number of gates in
the circuit plus the number of input qubits. We assume that quantum circuits
can be encoded as binary strings in a way such that the length of the encod-
ing is polynomially related to the circuit's size. A family Q = {Qx}x∈{0,1}∗ of
quantum circuits is said to be polynomial-time generated if there exists a de-
terministic polynomial-time Turing machine that, on input x ∈ {0, 1}∗, outputs
an encoding of Qx. For a polynomial-time generated family Q, the size of Qx is
polynomial in |x|. A quantum algorithm is polynomial-time if it is described by
some polynomial-time generated family of quantum circuits.
2.2.2 Interactive proof systems
In this chapter, we use the language-based deﬁnition of interactive proof systems.
All results also apply to interactive proof systems for promise problems; the
changes are straightforward.
Interactive proof systems involve two interacting parties: a prover P and a
veriﬁer V . Both the prover and the veriﬁer are allowed to perform classical or
quantum computations. Veriﬁers are restricted to polynomial-time computa-
tions, whereas provers may be computationally unrestricted. If at least one of
the parties is classical, all communication between the parties also is classical.
Only two quantum parties may exchange quantum information.
A pair (P, V ) is an interactive proof system for a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ if
there exist values ε, δ ≥ 0 such that the following properties hold:
Completeness: For every input x ∈ L, the interaction between P and V causes
V to accept with probability at least 1− ε.
Soundness: For every (possibly cheating) prover P ∗ and every input x 6∈ L,
the interaction between P ∗ and V causes V to accept with probability at
most δ.
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The value ε is called the completeness error of the proof system, the value δ is
called the soundness error. These errors may be either constants or functions
of the length of the input string x. In the latter case, it is assumed that they
can be computed deterministically in polynomial time.
It is generally desired that the completeness and soundness errors are ex-
ponentially small. If they are not, these errors can be reduced exponentially
quickly by sequential repetition of the proof system followed by majority vote,
or unanimous vote in the case that ε = 0. Therefore, it is suﬃcient that 1−ε−δ
is non-negligible (i.e., lower-bounded by the reciprocal of a polynomial). The
central result of this chapter is that the quantum zero-knowledge property is
robust under such sequential compositions.
The completeness and soundness errors can also be reduced by parallel rep-
etition of the proof system, but the zero-knowledge property is generally lost in
this case.
2.2.3 Polynomial quantum indistinguishability
A measurement circuit refers to any quantum circuit with mixed states, followed
by a measurement of all of its output qubits with respect to the standard basis.
If a measurement circuit Q is applied to a collection of qubits in the state ρ, then
Q(ρ) is interpreted as a string-valued random variable describing the result of
the measurement. The measurement circuits used in the following have a single
output qubit.
Deﬁnition 4 Let Φ and Ψ be admissible super-operators with n input qubits
andm output qubits. These super-operators are said to be (s, a, ε)-indistinguish-
able if for every mixed state σ on n + a qubits and every measurement circuit
Q of size s with m+ a input qubits,
|Pr [Q((Φ⊗ Ia)(σ)) = 1]− Pr [Q((Ψ⊗ Ia)(σ) = 1)]| < ε,
where Ia denotes the identity super-operator on a qubits.
Deﬁnition 5 (Polynomial quantum indistinguishability)
Let L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be an inﬁnite set and n and m be polynomially bounded func-
tions. Furthermore, let Φ = {Φx}x∈L and Ψ = {Ψx}x∈L be ensembles of ad-
missible super-operators such that for each x ∈ L, Φx and Ψx have n(|x|) input
qubits and m(|x|) output qubits. Then Φ and Ψ are said to be polynomially
quantum indistinguishable if for every choice of polynomially bounded functions
s, a, and q, Φx and Ψx are (s(|x|), a(|x|), q(|x|))-indistinguishable for all but
ﬁnitely many x ∈ L.
2.2.4 The quantum zero-knowledge property
Let (P, V ) be a quantum or classical interactive proof system for a language
L. An arbitrary (possibly cheating) quantum veriﬁer V ∗ is a quantum compu-
tational process interacting with P . In addition to the input string x, V ∗ is
allowed to take an auxiliary input. Both the auxiliary input and the output of
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V ∗ may be quantum. In this case, the auxiliary input is a collection of qubits
whose initial state is arbitrary and may be entangled with some external system.
The number of auxiliary input qubits and output qubits of V ∗ is determined by
polynomial bounds n and m, respectively.
The interaction of V ∗ with P on common input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a physical
process, and therefore induces an admissible super-operator Φx ∈ T(W,Z),
where W and Z are the vector spaces corresponding to the auxiliary input
qubits and output qubits of V ∗, respectively. So, V ∗ is described by the ensemble
{Φx}x∈{0,1}∗ and the functions n and m. Note that the super-operator Φx is
completely determined for any choice of x, V ∗, and P .
A simulator SV ∗ for a given veriﬁer V
∗ is a polynomial-time quantum al-
gorithm which takes as input a string x ∈ L as well as n(|x|) auxiliary input
qubits and outputs m(|x|) qubits. The simulator does not interact with P . For
each x ∈ L, the simulator induces an admissible super-operator Ψx ∈ T(W,Z).
So, SV ∗ can be described by the ensemble {Ψx}x∈L and the functions n and m.
Informally, the interactive proof system (P, V ) is quantum zero-knowledge
if the super-operators Φx and Ψx are indistinguishable for every x ∈ L. As in
the classical case, diﬀerent notions of indistinguishability give rise to diﬀerent
variants of zero-knowledge. Formally, the quantum zero-knowledge property is
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (Quantum zero-knowledge)
An interactive proof system (P, V ) for a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ is said to be
quantum statistical zero-knowledge if for every polynomial-time veriﬁer V ∗, there
exists a simulator SV ∗ such that ‖Φx −Ψx‖ is negligible in |x| for x ∈ L. The
proof system is called quantum computational zero-knowledge if the ensembles
{Φx}x∈L and {Ψx}x∈L are polynomially quantum indistinguishable. It is called
quantum perfect zero-knowledge if Φx and Ψx are identical for every x ∈ L. In
this case, the simulator is allowed to report failure with some small probability,
and the equality of the super-operators is conditioned on the simulator not
reporting failure.
In the perfect zero-knowledge case, allowing the simulator to fail is necessary
in order to guarantee that the simulator runs in strict polynomial time. With-
out loss of generality, the failure probability can be assumed to be negligible.
This is because there always exists another simulator which repeats the origi-
nal simulator up to a polynomial number of times and only fails if the original
simulator fails in all iterations. As soon as the original simulator does not fail,
its output is returned.
2.2.5 Sequential composition
We start by deﬁning the sequential composition and repetition of interactive
proof systems:
Deﬁnition 7 (Sequential composition and repetition)
Let (Pi, Vi) be interactive proof systems for the languages Li for i = 1, . . . , r.
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The sequential composition of the interactive proof systems (Pi, Vi) is an in-
teractive proof system (P, V ) for the language L = L1 × . . . × Lr deﬁned as
follows: on input x = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ L, the proof systems (Pi, Vi) are executed
sequentially on common input xi. V accepts if all the Vi's accept.
The r-fold sequential repetition of a proof system (P˜ , V˜ ) for a language L˜ is a
sequential composition (P, V ) such that for each i = 1, . . . , r, (Pi, Vi) = (P˜ , V˜ ).
In this case, (P, V ) also is a proof system for the language L˜.
Let V ∗ denote a (possibly cheating) polynomial-time veriﬁer interacting with
P . This veriﬁer can be described by a polynomial-time generated family of
quantum circuits. Let Qx denote the quantum circuit employed by V
∗ when
interacting with P on common input x ∈ L. The interaction can conceptually
be divided into sequential interactions of V ∗ with the provers Pi, i = 1, . . . , r. In
each of these interactions, V ∗ employs a part of the circuit Qx. So, V ∗ eﬀectively
employs a sequence of circuits (Q(1)x , . . . , Q
(r)
x ), where the input of circuit Q
(1)
x
is the auxiliary input of V ∗ and the input of circuit Q(i)x is the output of Q
(i−1)
x
for i = 2, . . . , r. Clearly, the size of circuit Q(i)x is polynomial in |x| for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
For every x = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ L, let Φx be the admissible super-operator
induced by the interaction of V ∗ with P on input x. Likewise, let Φ(i)x be the
admissible super-operator induced by the interaction of V ∗ with Pi on input x
(note that Pi only gets xi as input). Then, Φx = Φ
(r)
x . . .Φ
(1)
x .
In the proofs for the robustness of the quantum zero-knowledge property
under sequential composition given in the following section, a simulator for the
interaction of V ∗ with P is constructed by composing the simulators for the
interaction of V ∗ with Pi. These simulators are guaranteed to exist by the
quantum zero-knowledge properties of the protocols (Pi, Vi). As noted above,
the input of V ∗ when interacting with Pi is an element x = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ L.
Although Pi only gets xi as input, the input of the simulator for the interaction
of V ∗ with Pi also is the element x.
2.3 Robustness of the quantum zero-knowledge prop-
erty under sequential composition
In this section, we prove the robustness of the quantum statistical, perfect, and
computational zero-knowledge properties under sequential composition.
2.3.1 Quantum statistical zero-knowledge
The robustness of the quantum statistical zero-knowledge property under se-
quential composition is formalized in the following theorem.
Theorem 10 Let (P, V ) be a sequential composition of interactive proof systems
(Pi, Vi) for i = 1, . . . , r. If (Pi, Vi) is quantum statistical zero-knowledge for i =
1, . . . , r and r is polynomially bounded, then (P, V ) also is quantum statistical
zero-knowledge.
13
2.3. Robustness of the quantum zero-knowledge property under sequential composition
Proof Let Φx and Φ
(i)
x be as above for i = 1, . . . , r. In order to show that (P, V )
is quantum statistical zero-knowledge, we construct a simulator for (P, V ∗)
described by an ensemble {Ψx}x∈L of admissible super-operators such that
‖Φx −Ψx‖ is negligible.
Since the proof systems (Pi, Vi) are quantum statistical zero-knowledge for
i = 1, . . . , r, there exist simulators Si for the interaction of V ∗ with Pi, where
for each x = (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ L and each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, Si is described by an
admissible super-operator Ψ(i)x , and ‖Φ(i)x −Ψ(i)x ‖ is negligible.
The simulator S for (P, V ∗) is obtained by composing the simulators Si.
That is, S is described by the ensemble {Ψx}x∈L, where Ψx = Ψ(r)x . . .Ψ(1)x . We
show that S has the desired property. To this end, we show the following more
general fact:
For all r ≥ 1 and all admissible mappings Φ1, . . . ,Φr, Ψ1, . . . ,Ψr,
‖Φr . . .Φ1 −Ψr . . .Ψ1‖ ≤
r∑
i=1
‖Φi −Ψi‖. (2.1)
The proof is by induction on r. The basic step r = 1 is immediate. For the
induction step, set Φ = Φr−1 . . .Φ1 and Ψ = Ψr−1 . . .Ψ1. Then,
‖ΦrΦ−ΨrΨ‖ = ‖ΦrΦ− ΦrΨ + ΦrΨ−ΨrΨ‖
=
(2.2)
‖Φr(Φ−Ψ) + (Φr −Ψr)Ψ‖
≤
(2.3)
‖Φr(Φ−Ψ)‖ + ‖(Φr −Ψr)Ψ‖
≤
Lemma 1
‖Φr‖‖Φ−Ψ‖ + ‖Φr −Ψr‖‖Ψ‖
=
Lemma 2
‖Φ−Ψ‖ + ‖Φr −Ψr‖
≤
induction
r∑
i=1
‖Φi −Ψi‖.
Equality (2.2) holds because of linearity, Inequality (2.3) holds due to the tri-
angle inequality.
By setting Φi = Φ
(i)
x and Ψi = Ψ
(i)
x for i = 1, . . . , r in Inequality (2.1)
and observing that r is polynomially bounded, it follows that ‖Φx − Ψx‖ is
negligible, which completes the proof.
2.3.2 Quantum perfect zero-knowledge
Next, we prove the robustness of the quantum perfect zero-knowledge property
under sequential composition. The proof is nearly identical to the quantum
statistical zero-knowledge case.
Theorem 11 Let (P, V ) be a sequential composition of interactive proof systems
(Pi, Vi) for i = 1, . . . , r. If (Pi, Vi) is quantum perfect zero-knowledge for i =
1, . . . , r and r is polynomially bounded, then (P, V ) also is quantum perfect zero-
knowledge.
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Proof The simulator for the interaction of V ∗ with P is constructed in the
same way as in the proof of Theorem 10. We use the notation established
there. As mentioned above, the failure probabilities of the simulators for the
interaction of V ∗ with Pi are negligible. Since r is polynomially bounded, the
failure probability of the simulator for the interaction of V ∗ with P also is
negligible.
Conditioned on the simulator not failing, we need to show that ‖Φx−Ψx‖ =
0. Since the proof systems (Pi, Vi) are quantum perfect zero-knowledge, it holds
that ‖Φ(i)x −Ψ(i)x ‖ = 0. By Equation 2.1, ‖Φx−Ψx‖ ≤
∑r
i=1 ‖Φ(i)x −Ψ(i)x ‖ for
arbitrary r ≥ 1. So, ‖Φx −Ψx‖ = 0 as required.
2.3.3 Quantum computational zero-knowledge
Finally, we prove the robustness of the quantum computational zero-knowledge
property under sequential composition. The proof is conceptually diﬀerent from
the quantum statistical and perfect zero-knowledge cases, but resembles the
proof for the classical case (see [28]).
Theorem 12 Let (P, V ) be a sequential composition of interactive proof systems
(Pi, Vi) for i = 1, . . . , r. If (Pi, Vi) is quantum computational zero-knowledge for
i = 1, . . . , r and r is constant, then (P, V ) also is quantum computational zero-
knowledge.
Proof Let Φx, Φ, Φ
(i)
x , and Φ(i) be as in the proofs of Theorems 10 and 11. We
construct a simulator S for (P, V ∗) in the same way as before. Since the proof
systems (Pi, Vi) are quantum computational zero-knowledge for i = 1, . . . , r,
there exist simulators Si for the interaction of V
∗ with Pi described by ensem-
bles Ψ(i) = {Ψ(i)x }x∈L of admissible super-operators such that Φ(i) and Ψ(i) are
polynomially quantum indistinguishable. The simulator S for (P, V ∗) is again
obtained by composing the simulators Si, i.e., S is described by the ensemble
Ψ = {Ψx}x∈L, where Ψx = Ψ(r)x . . .Ψ(1)x .
We need to show that the ensembles Φ and Ψ are polynomially quantum
indistinguishable. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that Φ and Ψ are
polynomially quantum distinguishable: there exist polynomially bounded func-
tions a, q, a family of polynomially sized quantum circuits {Qx}x∈L, a collection
of mixed states {σx} on n(|x|) + a(|x|) qubits, and an inﬁnite set X ⊆ L such
that for every x ∈ X,
|Pr [Qx((Φx ⊗ I)(σx)) = 1]− Pr [Qx((Ψx ⊗ I)(σx)) = 1]| ≥ 1
q(|x|) . (2.4)
For every x ∈ L and i = 0, . . . , r, deﬁne the super-operator
H(i)x = Ψ
(r)
x . . .Ψ
(i+1)
x Φ
(i)
x . . .Φ
(1)
x .
We refer to the super-operator H
(i)
x as the ith hybrid. Clearly, H
(0)
x = Ψx
and H
(r)
x = Φx for every x ∈ L. Also, deﬁne the ensembles H(i) = {H(i)x }x∈L
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for i = 0, . . . , r.
For a super-operator Ω, let p(Ω) denote the expression
Pr [Qx((Ω⊗ I)(σx)) = 1] .
Then for any x ∈ X, there exists an index jx ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that∣∣∣p(H(jx)x )− p(H(jx−1)x )∣∣∣ ≥ 1rq(|x|) . (2.5)
To prove this claim, observe that
|p(Φx)− p(Ψx)| =
∣∣∣p(H(r)x )− p(H(0)x )∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
r∑
i=1
p(H(i)x )− p(H(i−1)x )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣p(H(i)x )− p(H(i−1)x )∣∣∣ ,
where the last inequality holds due to the triangle inequality. Since all sum-
mands in the last sum are positive and |p(Φx)− p(Ψx)| ≥ 1q(|x|) according to
Inequality (2.4), the claim follows.
Since r is constant, there exists a single index j ∈ {1, . . . , r} and an inﬁnite
set Xj ⊆ L such that Inequality (2.5) holds for every x ∈ Xj . This means that
the hybrids H
(j)
x and H
(j−1)
x are polynomially quantum distinguishable.
We show that it follows that Φ(j) and Ψ(j) are polynomially quantum dis-
tinguishable, which contradicts the assumption that (Pj , Vj) is quantum com-
putational zero-knowledge.
For each x ∈ Xj , deﬁne the super-operators
pref (j)x = Φ
(j−1)
x . . .Φ
(1)
x ,
suff (j)x = Ψ
(r)
x . . .Ψ
(j+1)
x .
With these deﬁnitions, we have
H(j)x = suff
(j)
x Φ
(j)
x pref
(j)
x ,
H(j−1)x = suff
(j)
x Ψ
(j)
x pref
(j)
x .
We construct a collection of mixed states {σ(j)x }x∈Xj and a quantum circuit
Q
(j)
x that distinguishes between Φ
(j)
x and Ψ
(j)
x for every x ∈ Xj . For each x ∈ Xj ,
set
σ(j)x = pref
(j)
x (σx).
Let ω be either Φ(j)x (σ
(j)
x ) or Ψ
(j)
x (σ
(j)
x ). On input the state ω and the index
j, the distinguisher Q
(j)
x computes
Ω = suff (j)x (ω)
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by sequentially employing the quantum circuits of the simulators Sj+1, . . . , Sr.
Then, Q
(j)
x computes Qx(Ω) and outputs the result.
Since by construction, Ω is either H(j)x (σ
(j)
x ) or H
(j−1)
x (σ
(j)
x ) and Qx dis-
tinguishes between these two for every x ∈ Xj , Q(j)x distinguishes between
Φ(j)x (σ
(j)
x ) and Ψ
(j)
x (σ
(j)
x ) for every x ∈ Xj . Since the size of Qx and the sizes of
the quantum circuits of the simulators Sj+1, . . . , Sr are polynomial in |x|, the
size of Q
(j)
x also is polynomial in |x|.
So, the ensemble Q(j) = {Q(j)x }x∈Xj of quantum circuits distinguishes be-
tween the ensembles Φ(j) and Ψ(j), which contradicts the assumption that the
interactive proof system (Pj , Vj) is quantum computational zero-knowledge.
Therefore, the ensembles Φ and Ψ are quantum computationally indistinguish-
able, which completes the proof.
In the above theorem, the assumption that the number of proof systems r is
constant is only required in the case that diﬀerent proof systems are composed.
If a single proof system is iterated, r may be polynomially bounded. More
formally, we have the following
Theorem 13 Let (P, V ) be the r-fold repetition of an interactive proof system
(P˜ , V˜ ). If (P˜ , V˜ ) is quantum computational zero-knowledge and r is polynomi-
ally bounded, then (P, V ) also is quantum computational zero-knowledge.
Proof The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 12. We use the
notation established there. In that proof, the assumption that the number of
proof systems r is constant is required in order to show that if H
(0)
x and H
(r)
x
can be distinguished for an inﬁnite set X ⊆ L, then there exists a single index
j such that H
(j)
x and H
(j−1)
x can be distinguished for an inﬁnite set Xj ⊆ X.
If r is polynomially bounded, there generally exists no single index j such
that H
(j)
x and H
(j−1)
x can be distinguished for an inﬁnite set Xj ∈ L. Instead,
for each x ∈ X, there exists an index jx such that H(jx)x and H(jx−1)x can be
distinguished.
The collection of mixed states {σ(jx)x }x∈X and the quantum circuits Q(jx)x are
constructed as in the proof of Theorem 12. Then for every x ∈ X, Q(jx)x distin-
guishes between Φ(jx)x (σ
(jx)
x ) and Ψ
(jx)
x (σ
(jx)
x ). So, for inﬁnitely many x ∈ L, the
real interaction of V ∗ with P and the simulated interaction can be distinguished.
This contradicts the assumption that (P˜ , V˜ ) is quantum computationally zero-
knowledge, which completes the proof.
Theorem 13 can be easily generalized to the case that in each of the r stages,
one of a constant number of proof systems is executed. In this case, r may also
be polynomially bounded.
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Chapter 3
CMSS  an eﬃcient variant of
the Merkle signature scheme
The Merkle signature scheme (MSS) [50] is an interesting quantum-immune dig-
ital signature candidate. Its security is based on the existence of cryptographic
hash functions. In contrast to established signature schemes, MSS can only
verify a bounded number of signatures using one public key. Also, MSS has
eﬃciency problems (key pair generation, large secret keys and signatures) and
was not used much in practice.
In this chapter, we review CMSS, a variant of MSS, with reduced private key
size, key pair generation time, and signature generation time.1 CMSS is based on
the PhD thesis of Coronado [13] and incorporates the improvements of MSS from
[77, 17]. We show that CMSS is competitive in practice by presenting a highly
eﬃcient CMSS Java implementation. The implementation is compliant with
the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [75] and is part of the open source
Java cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22]. The implementation permits easy
integration into existing public-key infrastructures. We present experiments
that show: as long as no more than 240 documents are signed, the CMSS key
pair generation time is reasonable, and signature generation and veriﬁcation
times in CMSS are competitive or even superior compared to RSA [64] and
ECDSA [39]. CMSS keys are speciﬁed using Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1) [41] which guarantees interoperability and permits eﬃcient generation
of X.509 certiﬁcates and PKCS #12 personal information exchange ﬁles [62].
Related work. In [77], Szydlo presents a method for the construction of au-
thentication paths requiring logarithmic space and time. Dods, Smart, and Stam
give the ﬁrst complete treatment of practical implementations of hash based dig-
ital signature schemes in [17]. In [52], Naor et. al. propose a C implementation
of MSS and give timings for up to 220 signatures. A preliminary version of
CMSS including security proofs appeared in the PhD thesis of Coronado [13]
and in [12]. Subsequent to the work described in this chapter, a generalization
1A preliminary version of the results described in this chapter has appeared in the pro-
ceedings of INDOCRYPT 2006 [8]. The paper is joint work with Johannes Buchmann, Luis
Carlos Coronado García, Erik Dahmen, and Elena Klintsevich.
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of CMSS has been proposed by Buchmann et al. in [9]. This generalization
is called GMSS. GMSS supports a cryptographically unlimited (280) number of
signatures and reduces the signature size as well as the signature generation cost
compared to CMSS.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.1, we describe the Winter-
nitz one-time signature scheme and the Merkle signature scheme. In Section 3.2,
we describe CMSS. Section 3.3 describes details of our CMSS Java implementa-
tion and the ASN.1 speciﬁcation of the keys. Section 3.4 presents experimental
data including a comparison with established signature schemes.
3.1 Mathematical background
Before we describe CMSS in Section 3.2, we ﬁrst describe the Winterzitz one-
time signature scheme used in CMSS and the Merkle signature scheme (MSS)
which CMSS is based on.
3.1.1 The Winternitz one-time signature scheme
In this section, we describe the Winternitz one-time signature scheme (OTSS)
that was ﬁrst mentioned in [50] and explicitly described in [17]. It is a general-
ization of the Merkle OTSS [50], which in turn is based on the Lamport-Diﬃe
OTSS [16]. The security of the Winternitz OTSS is based on the existence of
a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s [49]. It uses a block size
parameter w that denotes the number of bits that are processed simultaneously.
Algorithms 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 describe the Winternitz OTSS key pair generation,
signature generation, and signature veriﬁcation, respectively.
Algorithm 3.1 Winternitz OTSS key pair generation
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, parameters w ∈ N
and t = ds/we+ d(blog2ds/wec+ 1 + w)/we
Output: signature key X, veriﬁcation key Y
1: choose x1, . . . , xt ∈R {0, 1}s uniformly at random.
2: set X = (x1, . . . , xt).
3: compute yi = H2
w−1(xi) for i = 1, . . . , t.
4: compute Y = H(y1|| . . . ||yt), where || denotes concatenation.
5: return (X,Y ).
The parameter w makes the Winternitz OTSS very ﬂexible. It allows for a
trade-oﬀ between the signature size and the signature and key pair generation
times. If w is increased, more bits of H(d) are processed simultaneously and the
signature size decreases. However, more hash function evaluations are required
for key pair generation and signature generation. Decreasing w has the opposite
eﬀect. In [17], the authors show that using w = 2 requires the least number of
hash function evaluations per bit.
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Algorithm 3.2 Winternitz OTSS signature generation
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, parameters w ∈ N
and t = ds/we+ d(blog2ds/wec+ 1 + w)/we
Input: document d, signature key X
Output: one-time signature σ of d
1: compute the s bit hash value H(d) of document d.
2: split the binary representation of H(d) into ds/we blocks b1, . . . , bds/we of
length w, padding H(d) with zeroes from the left if required.
3: treat bi as the integer encoded by the respective block and compute the
checksum
C =
ds/we∑
i=1
2w − bi.
4: split the binary representation of C into d(blog2ds/wec+ 1 + w)/we blocks
bds/we+1, . . . , bt of length w, padding C with zeroes from the left if required.
5: treat bi as the integer encoded by the respective block and compute σi =
Hbi(xi), i = 1, . . . , t, where H0(x) = x.
6: return σ = (σ1, . . . , σt).
Algorithm 3.3 Winternitz OTSS signature veriﬁcation
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, parameters w ∈ N
and t = ds/we+ d(blog2ds/wec+ 1 + w)/we
Input: document d, signature σ = (σ1, . . . , σt), veriﬁcation key Y
Output: TRUE if the signature is valid, FALSE otherwise
1: compute b1, . . . , bt as in Algorithm 3.2.
2: compute φi = H2
w−1−bi(σi) for i = 1, . . . , t.
3: compute φ = H(φ1|| . . . ||φt).
4: if φ = Y then return TRUE else return FALSE
Example 1 Let w = 2 and H(d) = 110001110. Hence s = 9 and t = 8.
Therefore, we have (b1, . . . , b5) = (01, 10, 00, 11, 10), C = 12, and (b6, b7, b8) =
(00, 11, 00). The signature of d is
σ =
(
H(x1), H2(x2), x3, H3(x4), H2(x5), x6, H3(x7), x8
)
.
3.1.2 The Merkle signature scheme
The basic Merkle signature scheme (MSS) [50] works as follows. Let H :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s be a cryptographic hash function and assume that a one-time
signature scheme (OTSS) is given. Let h ∈ N and suppose that 2h signatures
are to be generated that are veriﬁable with one MSS public key.
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Key pair generation
First, generate 2h OTSS key pairs (Xi, Yi), i = 1, . . . , 2h. The Xi are the
signature keys. The Yi are the veriﬁcation keys. The MSS private key is the
sequence of OTSS signature keys. To determine the MSS public key, construct
a binary authentication tree as follows. Consider each veriﬁcation key Yi as a
bit string. The leafs of the authentication tree are the hash values H(Yi) of the
veriﬁcation keys. Each inner node (including the root) of the tree is the hash
value of the concatenation of its two children. The MSS public key is the root
of the authentication tree.
Signature generation
The OTSS key pairs are used sequentially. We explain the computation of
the MSS signature of some document d using the ith key pair (Xi, Yi). That
signature consists of the index i, the ith veriﬁcation key Yi, the OTSS signature
σ computed with the ith signature keyXi, and the authentication path A for the
veriﬁcation key Yi. The authentication path A is a sequence of nodes (ah, . . . , a1)
in the authentication tree of length h that is constructed as follows. The ﬁrst
node in that sequence is the leaf diﬀerent from the ith leaf that has the same
parent as the ith leaf. Also, if a node N in the sequence is not the last node,
then its successor is the node diﬀerent from N with the same parent as N .
Figure 3.1 shows an example of an authentication path for h = 2. Here, the
authentication path for Y2 is the sequence A2 = (a2, a1).
R
a1
a2 H(Y2)
Y2
Figure 3.1: Merkle's tree authentication
Signature veriﬁcation
To verify a MSS signature (i, Y, σ,A), the veriﬁer ﬁrst veriﬁes the one-time
signature σ with the veriﬁcation key Y . If this veriﬁcation fails, the veriﬁer
rejects the MSS signature as invalid. Otherwise, the veriﬁer checks the validity
of the veriﬁcation key Y by using the authentication path A. For this purpose,
the veriﬁer constructs a sequence of nodes of the tree of length h+ 1. The ﬁrst
node in the sequence is the ith leaf of the authentication tree. It is computed as
the hash H(Y ) of the veriﬁcation key Y . For each node N in the sequence which
is not the last node, its successor is the parent P of N in the authentication
tree. The veriﬁer can compute P since the authentication path A included in
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the signature contains the second child of P . The veriﬁer accepts the signature,
if the last node in the sequence is the MSS public key.
3.2 CMSS
In this section, we describe CMSS. It is an improvement of the Merkle signature
scheme (MSS) [50]. A preliminary version of CMSS including security proofs
appeared in the PhD thesis of Coronado [13] and in [12].
For any h ∈ N, MSS signs N = 2h documents using N key pairs of a one-
time signature scheme. Unfortunately, for N > 225, MSS becomes impractical
because the private keys are very large and key pair generation takes very long.
CMSS can sign N = 22h documents for any h ∈ N. For this purpose, two
MSS authentication trees, a main tree and a subtree, each with 2h leafs, are used.
The public CMSS key is the root of the main tree. Data is signed using MSS
with the subtree. The root of the subtree is authenticated by an MSS signature
that uses the main tree. After the ﬁrst 2h signatures have been generated, a new
subtree is constructed and used to generate the next 2h signatures. In order to
make the private key smaller, the OTSS signature keys are generated using a
pseudo random number generator (PRNG) [49]. Only the seed for the PRNG
is stored in the CMSS private key.
CMSS key pair generation is much faster than that of MSS, since key gen-
eration is dynamic. At any given time, only two trees, each with only 2h leafs,
have to be constructed. CMSS can eﬃciently be used to sign up to N = 240
documents. Also, CMSS private keys are much smaller than MSS private keys,
since only a seed for the PRNG is stored in the CMSS private key, in contrast
to a sequence of N OTSS signature keys in the case of MSS. So, CMSS can be
used in any practical application. CMSS is illustrated in Figure 3.2 for h = 2.
RR
b1,1
b1,2
b2,1
b2,2
sign R1 sign R2
sign d1 sign d2
d1 d2
R1
a4,1
a4,2
R2
a1,1
a1,2
Figure 3.2: CMSS with h = 2
In the following, CMSS is described in detail. First, we describe CMSS key
pair generation. Then, we explain the CMSS signature generation process. In
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contrast to other signature schemes, the CMSS private key is updated after
every signature generation. This is necessary in order to keep the private key
small and to make CMSS forward secure [12]. Such signature schemes are called
key-evolving signature schemes and were ﬁrst deﬁned in [5].
3.2.1 Key pair generation
Algorithm 3.7 describes CMSS key pair generation. The algorithm uses two
subroutines described in Algorithms 3.5 and 3.6. CMSS uses the Winternitz
OTSS described in Section 3.1.1. For the OTSS key pair generation, we use a
pseudo random number generator (PRNG) f : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}s × {0, 1}s [49].
For CMSS, we use the hash-based PRNG described in FIPS 186-2 [53]. This
PRNG is described in Algorithm 3.4. The modiﬁed Winternitz OTSS key pair
generation process using a PRNG is described in Algorithm 3.5.
Algorithm 3.4 Hash-based PRNG according to FIPS 186-2
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s
Input: a seed seedin ∈ {0, 1}r
Output: a seed seedout ∈ {0, 1}r and a random number x ∈ {0, 1}s
1: compute x = H(seedin)
2: compute seedout = seedin + x+ 1 mod 2r
3: return (seedout , x)
Algorithm 3.5 Winternitz OTSS key pair generation using a PRNG
System parameters: PRNG f : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}r × {0, 1}s, hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, parameters w ∈ N and t = ds/we + d(blog2ds/wec +
1 + w)/we
Input: a seed seedin ∈R {0, 1}r chosen uniformly at random
Output: a Winternitz OTSS key pair (X,Y ) and a seed seedout ∈ {0, 1}r
1: compute (seedout , s0) = f(seedin)
2: for i = 1, . . . , t do
3: compute (si, xi) = f(si−1)
4: set X = (x1, . . . , xt)
5: compute the veriﬁcation key Y as in steps 3 and 4 of Algorithm 3.1
6: return (X,Y ) and seedout
Algorithm 3.6 is used to construct a binary authentication tree and its ﬁrst
authentication path. This is done leaf-by-leaf, using a stack for storing inter-
mediate results. Algorithm 3.6 carries out the computation for one leaf. It is
assumed that in addition to the node value, the height of a node is stored. The
algorithm is inspired by [50] and [77].
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Algorithm 3.6 Partial construction of an authentication tree
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s
Input: a leaf value H(Y ), an algorithm stack stack , and a sequence of nodes A
Output: the updated stack stack and the updated sequence A
1: set in = H(Y )
2: while in has same height as top node from stack do
3: if in has greater height than last node in A or A is empty then
4: append in to A
5: pop top node top from stack
6: compute in = H(top||in)
7: push in onto stack
8: return stack , A
Algorithm 3.7 CMSS key pair generation
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, PRNG f :
{0, 1}r → {0, 1}r × {0, 1}s, Winternitz parameter w
Input: parameter h ∈ N, two seeds seedmain , seedsub ∈ {0, 1}r
Output: a CMSS key pair (priv , R)
1: set N = 2h and seed0 = seedmain
2: initialize empty stack stackmain and empty sequence of nodes A1
3: for i = 1, . . . , N do
4: compute ((Xi, Yi), seed i)← Algorithm 3.5(seed i−1)
5: compute (stackmain , A1)← Algorithm 3.6(H(Yi), stackmain , A1)
6: let R be the single node in stackmain ; R is the root of the main tree
7: set seed0 = seedsub
8: initialize empty stack stacksub and empty sequence of nodes B1
9: for j = 1, . . . , N do
10: compute ((Xj , Yj), seed j)← Algorithm 3.5(seed j−1)
11: compute (stacksub , B1)← Algorithm 3.6(H(Yj), stacksub , B1)
12: let R1 be the single node in stacksub ; R1 is the root of the ﬁrst subtree
13: set seednext = seedN
14: obtain ﬁrst OTSS key pair of main tree: ((X1, Y1), seedtemp) ←
Algorithm 3.5(seedmain)
15: compute the one-time signature of R1: σ1 ← Algorithm 3.2(R1, X1)
16: initialize empty stacks stackmain , stacksub , and stacknext and empty sequence
of nodes C1
17: set priv = (1, 1, seed{main,sub,next}, A1, B1, C1, stack{main,sub,next}, σ1)
18: return (priv,R)
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CMSS key pair generation is carried out in two parts. First, the ﬁrst subtree
and its ﬁrst authentication path are generated using Algorithms 3.5 and 3.6.
Then, the main tree and its ﬁrst authentication path are computed. The CMSS
public key is the root of the main tree. The CMSS private key consists of
two indices i and j, three seeds for the PRNG, three authentication paths (of
which one is constructed during signature generation), the root of the current
subtree and three algorithm stacks for subroutines. The details are described in
Algorithm 3.7.
3.2.2 Signature generation
CMSS signature generation is carried out in four parts. First, the MSS signature
of document d is computed using the subtree. Then, the MSS signature of the
root of the subtree is computed using the main tree. Then, the next subtree is
partially constructed. Finally, the CMSS private key is updated.
Algorithm 3.8 leafCalc
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, PRNG f :
{0, 1}r → {0, 1}r × {0, 1}s
Input: current leaf index i, current seed seed , leaf index j > i
Output: leaf value H(Yj) of jth leaf
1: set seed0 = seed
2: for k = 1, . . . , j − i do compute (seedk, s0) = f(seedk−1)
3: compute ((Xj , Yj), seedout)← Algorithm 3.5(seed j−i)
4: return H(Yj)
The CMSS signature generation algorithm uses an algorithm of Szydlo for
the eﬃcient computation of authentication paths. We do not explain this algo-
rithm here, but instead refer the reader to [77] for details. We call the algorithm
Szydlo.auth. Input to Szydlo.auth are the authentication path of the current
leaf, the seed for the current tree and an algorithm stack. Output are the next
authentication path and the updated stack. Szydlo.auth needs to compute
leaf values of leafs with higher index than the current leaf. For this purpose,
Algorithm 3.8 is used. The details of CMSS signature generation are described
in Algorithm 3.9.
3.2.3 Signature veriﬁcation
CMSS signature veriﬁcation proceeds in two steps. First, the two authentication
paths are validated, then the validity of the two one-time signatures is veriﬁed.
The details are described in Algorithm 3.10.
3.3 Speciﬁcation and implementation
This section describes parameter choices and details of our CMSS implemen-
tation. CMSS is implemented as part of the open source Java cryptographic
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Algorithm 3.9 CMSS signature generation
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s, PRNG f :
{0, 1}r → {0, 1}r × {0, 1}s
Input: document d, CMSS private key priv =
(
i, j, seed{main,sub,next}, Ai, Bj ,
C1, stack{main,sub,next}, σi
)
Output: signature sig of d, updated private key priv , or STOP if no more sig-
natures can be generated
1: if i = 2h + 1 then STOP
2: obtain OTSS key pair of current subtree:
((Xj , Yj), seedsub)← Algorithm 3.5(seedsub)
3: compute the one-time signature of d: τj ← Algorithm 3.2(d,Xj)
4: set sig = (i, j, σi, τj , Ai, Bj)
5: compute the next authentication path for the subtree:
(Bj+1, stacksub)← Szydlo.auth(Bj , seedsub , stacksub)
6: replace Bj in priv by Bj+1
7: partially construct the next subtree:
((Xj , Yj), seednext)← Algorithm 3.5(seednext)
(stacknext , C1)← Algorithm 3.6(H(Yj), stacknext , C1)
8: if j < 2h then set j = j + 1
9: else
10: let Ri+1 be the single node in stacknext . This node is the root of the
(i+ 1)th subtree.
11: compute the next authentication path for the main tree:
(Ai+1, stackmain)← Szydlo.auth(Ai, seedmain , stackmain)
12: replace Ai in priv by Ai+1
13: replace Bj in priv by C1
14: compute new main tree seed: (seedtemp , si)← f(seedmain)
15: replace seedmain in priv by seedtemp
16: obtain next OTSS key pair of main tree:
((Xi+1, Yi+1), seedtemp)← Algorithm 3.5(seedtemp)
17: compute the one-time signature of Ri+1:
σi+1 ← Algorithm 3.2(Ri+1, Xi+1)
18: and replace σi in priv by σi+1
19: set i = i+ 1 and j = 1
20: return the CMSS signature sig of d and the updated private key priv
library FlexiProvider [22]. The FlexiProvider is fully compliant to the Java
Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [75]. Therefore, it is possible to integrate the
implementation into any application that uses the JCA.
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Algorithm 3.10 CMSS signature veriﬁcation
System parameters: hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s
Input: document d, CMSS signature sig = (i, j, σi, τj , Ai, Bj), CMSS public
key R
Output: TRUE if the signature is valid, FALSE otherwise.
1: repeat steps 1 to 3 of Algorithm 3.3 with input d and τj to obtain an alleged
veriﬁcation key ψj
2: using ψj and Bj , compute the root Ri of the current subtree as in the case
of MSS signature veriﬁcation (see Section 3.1.2).
3: repeat steps 1 to 3 of Algorithm 3.3 with input Ri and σi to obtain an
alleged veriﬁcation key φi
4: using φi and Ai, compute the root Q of the main tree as in the case of MSS.
5: if Q is not equal to the CMSS public key R then return FALSE
6: verify the one-time signature τj of d using Algorithm 3.3 and veriﬁcation
key ψj
7: verify the one-time signature σi of Ri using Algorithm 3.3 and veriﬁcation
key φi
8: if both veriﬁcations succeed return TRUE else return FALSE
3.3.1 Scheme parameters
The hash function H used for the OTSS and the authentication trees can be
chosen among SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The Winternitz pa-
rameter can be chosen as w = 1, . . . , 4. As described earlier, for CMSS, we use
the hash-based PRNG according to FIPS 186-2 [53]. For this PRNG, the same
hash function is used as for the OTSS and authentication trees.
As described earlier, CMSS makes use of the Winternitz OTSS. However,
it is possible to replace the Winternitz OTSS by any other one-time signature
scheme. If unlike in the case of Winternitz OTSS the veriﬁcation keys can not be
computed from the signature keys, they have to be part of the CMSS signature.
Also, the hash-based PRNG can be replaced by any other PRNG.
3.3.2 Signature generation and veriﬁcation
For the computation of authentication paths, we use the preprint version of the
algorithm Szydlo.auth which is more eﬃcient than the conference version. We
refer the reader to [77] for details.
The one-time signature of the root of the current subtree is stored as part
of the CMSS private key. This speeds up signature generation, but increases
the private key size. Each time a new subtree is used, the root of this subtree
is computed. This is done while generating a signature with the last leaf of the
preceding subtree.
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3.3.3 Encoding
Keys
CMSS keys are encoded as ASN.1 structures [41] in order to be used with public-
key infrastructures. In addition to what was described in Section 3.2, both the
CMSS public and private key contain the OID of the algorithm they can be
used with. The CMSS public and private key ASN.1 structures are
CMSSPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER
height INTEGER
root OCTET STRING
}
CMSSPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER
indexSub INTEGER
indexMain INTEGER
seedMain OCTET STRING
seedSub OCTET STRING
seedNext OCTET STRING
authMain AuthPath
authSub AuthPath
authNext AuthPath
stackMain Stack
stackSub Stack
stackNext Stack
subtreeRootSig OCTET STRING
}
AuthPath ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
Stack ::= SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING
The public key structure is embedded into a SubjectPublicKeyInfo struc-
ture as deﬁned in RFC 3280 [36]. The private key structure is embedded into a
PrivateKeyInfo structure as deﬁned in PKCS #8 [61].
Object Identiﬁers (OIDs)
The main OID for CMSS is
1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.
For each choice of the hash function and the Winternitz parameter, there exists
a distinct subsidiary OID. These subsidiary OIDs are summarized in Table 3.1.
Column Hash function denotes the hash function, column w denotes the
Winternitz parameter.
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Hash function w Object Identiﬁer (OID)
SHA-1 1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.1
SHA-1 2 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.2
SHA-1 3 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.3
SHA-1 4 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.4
SHA-256 1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.5
SHA-256 2 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.6
SHA-256 3 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.7
SHA-256 4 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.8
SHA-384 1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.9
SHA-384 2 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.10
SHA-384 3 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.11
SHA-384 4 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.12
SHA-512 1 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.13
SHA-512 2 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.14
SHA-512 3 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.15
SHA-512 4 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.2.16
Table 3.1: OIDs assigned to CMSS
3.4 Timings and comparison
This section compares our CMSS implementation with RSA, DSA, and ECDSA.
We compare the times required for key pair generation, signature generation,
and signature veriﬁcation as well as the sizes of the private key, public key, and
signatures. For all algorithms, the implementations provided by the open source
Java cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22] are used.
The results are summarized in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. In case of CMSS,
the ﬁrst column denotes the logarithm to the base 2 of the number of possi-
ble signatures. For RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, the column mod denotes the
size of the modulus. Columns spubKey and sprivKey denote the size of the
DER-encoded public and private key ASN.1 structures, respectively. Columns
tkpg, tsign, and tverify denote the timings for key pair generation, signature
generation, and signature veriﬁcation, respectively.
The experiments were made using a computer equipped with a Pentium M
1.6 GHz CPU, 2 GB of RAM and running Microsoft Windows XP. The code
was compiled with JDK 1.3 and run under JRE 1.6.
Comparison
The tables show that the CMSS implementation oﬀers competitive signing and
verifying times compared to RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. The tables also show
that CMSS public keys are smaller than RSA, DSA, and ECDSA public keys.
In the case of N = 240, key pair generation takes quite long. However, this
does not aﬀect the usability of the implementation, since key pair generation
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logN spubKey sprivKey ssignature tkpg tsign tverify
CMSS with SHA-1, w = 1
20 60 bytes 5.1 KB 7.0 KB 1.7 sec 5.1 ms 0.6 ms
30 60 bytes 6.0 KB 7.2 KB 54.0 sec 7.1 ms 0.6 ms
40 60 bytes 6.8 KB 7.4 KB 28.0 min 9.5 ms 0.6 ms
CMSS with SHA-1, w = 2
20 60 bytes 3.5 KB 3.7 KB 1.6 sec 4.7 ms 0.7 ms
30 60 bytes 4.3 KB 3.9 KB 47.9 sec 6.4 ms 0.7 ms
40 60 bytes 5.2 KB 4.1 KB 25.1 min 8.6 ms 0.7 ms
CMSS with SHA-1, w = 3
20 60 bytes 2.9 KB 2.6 KB 1.9 sec 5.9 ms 0.9 ms
30 60 bytes 3.8 KB 2.8 KB 59.1 sec 8.1 ms 0.9 ms
40 60 bytes 4.6 KB 3.0 KB 31.6 min 10.9 ms 0.9 ms
CMSS with SHA-1, w = 4
20 60 bytes 2.6 KB 2.1 KB 2.7 sec 8.6 ms 1.3 ms
30 60 bytes 3.5 KB 2.3 KB 1.4 min 11.9 ms 1.4 ms
40 60 bytes 4.4 KB 2.5 KB 46.0 min 15.8 ms 1.4 ms
Table 3.2: Timings and key sizes of CMSS with SHA-1
mod spubKey sprivKey ssignature tkpg tsign tverify
RSA with SHA-1
1024 162 bytes 634 bytes 128 bytes 0.7 sec 13.3 ms 0.8 ms
2048 294 bytes 1216 bytes 256 bytes 8.6 sec 92.0 ms 2.7 ms
DSA with SHA-1
1024 442 bytes 334 bytes 46 bytes 12.5 sec 7.8 ms 15.5 ms
2048 838 bytes 608 bytes 62 bytes 3.4 min 40.5 ms 81.1 ms
ECDSA with SHA-1
192 76 bytes 60 bytes 54 bytes 13.7 ms 12.4 ms 15.0 ms
256 92 bytes 68 bytes 70 bytes 23.3 ms 23.2 ms 27.4 ms
384 124 bytes 84 bytes 102 bytes 61.4 ms 59.8 ms 70.1 ms
Table 3.3: Timings and key sizes of RSA, DSA, and ECDSA with SHA-1
has to be performed only once. Also, the size of the signature and the private
key is larger compared to RSA, DSA, and ECDSA. While this might lead to
concerns regarding memory constrained devices, those sizes are still reasonable
in an end-user scenario.
To summarize, CMSS oﬀers a very good trade-oﬀ concerning signature gen-
eration and veriﬁcation times compared to established digital signatures while
preserving a reasonable signature and private key size. The space and time re-
quirements of CMSS are suﬃciently small for practical usage. Also, the number
of signatures that can be generated is large enough for practical purposes.
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logN spubKey sprivKey ssignature tkpg tsign tverify
CMSS with SHA-256, w = 1
20 72 bytes 11.1 KB 17.3 KB 5.1 sec 15.4 ms 2.0 ms
30 72 bytes 12.4 KB 17.6 KB 2.7 min 21.5 ms 2.1 ms
40 72 bytes 13.7 KB 17.9 KB 85.5 min 28.9 ms 2.1 ms
CMSS with SHA-256, w = 2
20 72 bytes 6.9 KB 9.0 KB 4.4 sec 13.9 ms 2.0 ms
30 72 bytes 8.2 KB 9.3 KB 2.4 min 19.2 ms 2.1 ms
40 72 bytes 9.6 KB 9.6 KB 75.6 min 25.8 ms 2.2 ms
CMSS with SHA-256, w = 3
20 72 bytes 5.6 KB 6.3 KB 5.5 sec 17.6 ms 2.7 ms
30 72 bytes 6.9 KB 6.6 KB 3.0 min 24.4 ms 2.8 ms
40 72 bytes 8.2 KB 6.9 KB 95.1 min 32.6 ms 2.8 ms
CMSS with SHA-256, w = 4
20 72 bytes 4.8 KB 4.8 KB 8.1 sec 25.2 ms 4.0 ms
30 72 bytes 6.2 KB 5.1 KB 4.3 min 35.0 ms 4.0 ms
40 72 bytes 7.5 KB 5.4 KB 136.2 min 47.0 ms 4.1 ms
Table 3.4: Timings and key sizes of CMSS with SHA-256
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Eﬃciency improvements for
NTRU
The lattice-based public-key cryptosystem NTRU [32] in its NAEP/SVES-3
variant [33, 34] is a promising candidate for a quantum-immune encryption
scheme. SVES-3 is currently undergoing a standardization process and will
presumably be included in the upcoming IEEE standard 1363.1 [35]. We refer
to the SVES-3 variant proposed in the draft standard as NTRUSVES.
In this chapter, we propose a new algorithm for the fast multiplication of
NTRU polynomials.1 Depending on the parameters, our algorithm achieves an
average-case speedup between 20% and 37% compared to the algorithm of [35]
and between 11% to 23% compared to the algorithm described in [45], which
are the best currently known algorithms. The proposed algorithm is also very
space eﬃcient.
We also report about a highly eﬃcient Java implementation of NTRUSVES
which follows draft version 8 of IEEE P1363.1 and, in addition, includes our
proposed multiplication algorithm. The implementation is compliant with the
Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [75] and will be part of the open source
Java cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22].
Related work. IEEE P1363.1 [35] proposes an algorithm for fast multipli-
cation of NTRU polynomials which is due to Bailey et al. [4]. Lee et al. [45]
present an improved sliding window multiplication algorithm. The authors state
that using their algorithm, the NTRU encryption and decryption operations can
be sped up by up to 32% compared to Bailey et al.'s algorithm. However, this
seems to be a best-case estimate. Our experiments show that the average-case
speedup is between 10% and 18%, depending on the used parameter set.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 gives a brief mathematical
description of NTRU and NAEP/SVES-3. In Section 4.2, we describe our new
multiplication algorithm and compare it with the algorithms of Bailey et al. [4]
1A preliminary version of the results described in this chapter has appeared in the pro-
ceedings of SICHERHEIT 2008 [10]. The paper is joint work with Johannes Buchmann and
Richard Lindner.
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and Lee et al. [45]. Section 4.3 provides details of our NTRUSVES implementa-
tion. Section 4.4 presents timings of NTRUSVES including a comparison with
the RSA encryption scheme.
4.1 Mathematical background
4.1.1 The NTRU encryption scheme
In this section, we give a brief mathematical description of the NTRU encryption
scheme according to IEEE P1361.1-D9 [35].
Parameters
NTRU is used with the following parameters: prime integers N, q, the integer
p = 2, integers dF , dg, dr < N . The security requirements concerning the choice
of the parameters can be found in Annexes A.1 to A.3 of the draft standard.
An algorithm for constructing parameter sets is given in Annex A.4. Predeﬁned
parameter sets can be found in Annex A.5 of the draft standard.
All computations in this section are performed in the ring of convolution
modular polynomials
R = Z[X] / (XN − 1),
where polynomials of degree less than N are used as representatives for the
residue classes. Let D(d) denote the set of binary polynomials of degree less
than N with hamming weight d.
Key pair generation
Choose uniformly at random the binary polynomials F ∈ D(dF ) and g ∈ D(dg).
Compute f = 1 + pF . If the congruence f · f−1 ≡ 1 (mod q) has a solution,
compute such a solution f−1. Otherwise, start over. Compute the polynomial
h = f−1pg mod q.
For the rest of the chapter, the notation a = b mod q stands for reducing the
coeﬃcients of b modulo q and assigning the result to a. The private key is f ,
the public key is h.
Encryption
The message space is the set of binary polynomials of degree less than N . To
encrypt a message m, randomly choose a binary blinding polynomial r ∈ D(dr).
The ciphertext is the polynomial
e = m+ rh mod q.
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Decryption
Let e be the ciphertext. Compute
a = fe mod q.
The message m is obtained from a by reducing the coeﬃcients of a modulo p.
The decryption operation is correct if the parameters dF , dg, and dr are
chosen such that
1 + p(dF + min{dg, dr}) < q.
This is guaranteed for the predeﬁned parameter sets of IEEE P1363.1-D9 and
for parameter sets generated by the parameter generation algorithm given in
the draft standard.
Product form variant
The product form variant is a more eﬃcient variant of NTRU in which the
binary polynomials F and r are replaced by so-called product form polynomials.
Product form polynomials are of the form f1f2 + f3, where f1, f2, and f3 are
very sparse binary polynomials. We omit the detailed description of the product
form variant and instead refer the reader to [35].
4.1.2 NAEP/SVES-3
The NTRU Asymmetric Encryption Padding (NAEP) [33, 34] is a scheme based
on NTRU that is provably secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks
in the random oracle model, similar to OAEP+ for RSA. Its most common
instantiation is the Shortest Vector Encryption Scheme, third revision (SVES-
3). In the following, we give a brief description of NAEP/SVES-3.
The scheme uses two hash functions G and H. Fix the maximal message bit
length maxLen and the bit length bLen of some random strings. Precompute
the internal message bit length
nLen = bLen + (log2(maxLen) + 1) + maxLen.
Encryption (see Figure 4.1)
In order to encrypt a messageM , compute its bit length MLen and choose a ran-
dom string b of length bLen. Compute a blinding polynomial r = G(ID ||M ||b),
where ID is a number that uniquely identiﬁes the used parameter set.
Pad the message as (b||MLen||M ||00 . . .) to obtain a string M of the prede-
ﬁned bit length nLen. Compute the exclusive-or of M with H(rh) obtain a bit
string m. Interpret m as a binary polynomial and encrypt it using the NTRU
encryption primitive described in the preceding section.
35
4.2. Pattern multiplication
M
Mb
b ID
MLen 00 . . . G(. . .)
r
XOR H(. . .) rh
m +
e
Figure 4.1: SVES-3 encryption
Decryption (see Figure 4.2)
Decrypt a ciphertext e with the NTRU decryption primitive described in the
preceding section into a polynomial m. Compute the diﬀerence rh = e−m and
the exclusive-or of e with rh to obtain a bit string of length nLen. Interpret this
bit string as (b′||MLen ′||M ′||trunc). Check that trunc consists only of zeroes
and that MLen ′ is the bit length of M ′. Compute r′ = G(ID ||M ′||b′) and check
whether r′h equals rh which was computed earlier. If all checks are positive,
return M as the decrypted message.
4.2 Pattern multiplication
We propose a new algorithm for the multiplication of elements of R with bi-
nary polynomials which is based on the ideas of Bailey et al. [4] and Lee et
al. [45]. Like Lee et al., our algorithm uses bit patterns of the binary polyno-
mial. The algorithm of Lee et al. considers bit patterns up to a maximal length
and precomputes pattern polynomials for each pattern length. Our algorithm
considers only the bit patterns actually occurring in b and computes the pattern
polynomials when needed instead of using precomputation.
Depending on the parameters, the proposed algorithm is between 20% and
37% faster on average than the algorithm of Bailey et al. and between 11% and
23% faster on average than the algorithm of Lee et al. (see Section 4.2.3). We
call the new algorithm pattern multiplication. The algorithm is described in the
following sections.
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e
a = fe mod q
m′ = a mod p a−m′
XOR H(. . .) =?
b′ MLen ′ M ′ 00 . . .? rh
ID G(. . .) r
M
Figure 4.2: SVES-3 decryption
4.2.1 Basic idea
Throughout the chapter, we identify polynomials a(X) =
∑N−1
i=0 aiX
i ∈ R
with their coeﬃcient vector (a0, . . . , aN−1). The product ab of two polynomials
a, b ∈ R can be represented by the convolution operation c = a ∗ b, which is
given by the equation
ck =
∑
0 ≤ i, j < N
i+ j ≡ k (mod N)
aibj
for k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Bailey et al. [4] observed that if the polynomial b is binary, the product can
be computed using only additions over Z and rotations of the coeﬃcient vector
of a. In the following, we denote binary polynomials as bit strings. Consider
the following example:
0 00001 1 1111
a
b =
ab =
0 3 4 6 8 10 # rotations
a+X3a+X4a+X6a+X8a+X10a
Figure 4.3: Multiplication of a, b using additions and rotations
For each non-zero coeﬃcient bi of b, polynomials of the form X
ia are added
in order to compute the product ab. The multiplication of a polynomial a
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with a monomial Xi in R corresponds to i right rotations of the coeﬃcient
vector of a, where the right rotation is deﬁned as the mapping (a0, . . . , aN−1) 7→
(aN−1, a0, . . . , aN−2).
So if b has hamming weight d, the product ab can be computed with dN
additions over Z (since the resulting polynomial is initialized as zero and all d
summands are added to it). This multiplication algorithm is incorporated into
the IEEE P1363.1 draft standard.
Lee et al. [45] observed that it is possible to reduce the number of additions
needed to compute the product ab by using bit patterns of the binary polynomial
b. By a bit pattern, we understand two 1s separated by a (possibly empty)
sequence of 0s. We say that such a bit pattern has length l if the two 1s are
separated by l − 1 0s.
Reconsider the polynomial b given in Figure 4.3. The bit pattern 101 occurs
twice. By computing a+X2a once and storing it in a lookup table, the number
of additions needed to compute the product ab can be reduced from dN = 6 ·11
to 5 · 11 (see Figure 4.4).
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 11 01
0 4 8
b =
ab =
# rotations
a+X3a a+X2a
a+X3a+X4(a+X2a) +X8(a+X2a)
Figure 4.4: Multiplication of a, b using bit patterns
More generally, it is possible to reduce the number of additions needed to
compute the product ab whenever a bit pattern occurs more than once in b. It
is thus desirable to choose bit patterns in a way that maximizes the number of
pattern occurrences and to eﬃciently identify the patterns in b.
The algorithm of Lee et al. only considers bit patterns of length less than or
equal to a parameter w which is chosen as w = 5 for the proposed parameter sets.
For each pattern length l = 1, . . . , w, the polynomial a+X la is precomputed and
stored in a lookup table. The non-zero coeﬃcients not belonging to any such
bit pattern are treated as in the algorithm of Bailey et al. Binary polynomials
are represented as bit strings. Lee et al. observed that considering bit strings
containing more than two 1s does not achieve any notable speedup because the
probability that these strings occur more than once in b is very low.
Our proposed algorithm also uses bit patterns, but the patterns can be of
arbitrary length, and only the patterns actually occurring in b are considered.
Thus, all non-zero coeﬃcients of b belong to a pattern, except for a single coeﬃ-
cient in case that the hamming weight of b is odd. We omit the precomputation
step of the algorithm of Lee et al. and instead compute the polynomials a+X la
when needed. We also represent binary polynomials as the sequence of the de-
grees of their monomials, in accordance with the IEEE P1363.1 proposal. It
shows that pattern ﬁnding can be performed much easier and faster in this
representation.
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4.2.2 The proposed algorithm
In this section, we describe our proposed algorithms for ﬁnding bit patterns
of a binary polynomial b and for computing the product of b with arbitrary
polynomials a ∈ R using these patterns.
Pattern ﬁnding
A binary polynomial b of hamming weight d is represented by the sequence
D0, . . . , Dd−1 of the degrees of its monomials in ascending order. The polynomial
is traversed once in reverse order, starting at Dd−1. For each possible pattern
length l ∈ 1, . . . , N − d+ 1, a list Ll of pattern locations is created. Every pair
of degrees (Di, Di−1) represents a bit pattern of length Di −Di−1. The degree
Di is stored in the list LDi−Di−1 and i is decreased by 2. In case that d is odd,
the remaining single degree D0 is stored separately in a list L0. The detailed
description of the algorithm can be found in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1 Pattern ﬁnding
System parameters: integer N
Input: a binary polynomial b given as the sequence D0, . . . , Dd−1 of the degrees
of its monomials in ascending order
Output: a sequence of lists (L0, . . . , LN−d+1) of bit pattern locations of b
1: create empty arrays (L0, . . . , LN−d+1) . holds the result
2: set index ← d− 1 . start at highest non-zero coeﬃcient of b
3: while index > 0 do . as long as 2 or more coeﬃcients remain
4: set len ← Dindex −Dindex−1 . compute pattern length
5: append Dindex to Llen . append degree to corresponding list
6: set index ← index − 2 . go to next pair of coeﬃcients
7: if index = 0 then . if a single degree remains
8: append D0 to L0 . append it to L0
9: return (L0, . . . , LN−d+1) . return result
The algorithm requires bd/2c subtractions over Z and memory for storing
dd/2e integers from the interval [0, N).
Pattern multiplication
In the following, we describe our proposed algorithm for computing the prod-
uct ab of an arbitrary polynomial a ∈ R and a binary polynomial b given as
the sequence of lists (L0, . . . , LN−d+1) of bit pattern locations as computed by
Algorithm 4.1.
Each non-empty list Ll, l > 0 represents a bit pattern of b with length l. For
each such Ll, the corresponding pattern polynomial P = a+X la is computed.
For each element D of the list Ll, this pattern polynomial is right rotated
D times and added to the resulting polynomial (see Figure 4.4). A possibly
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Algorithm 4.2 Pattern multiplication
System parameters: integers N , q
Input: a polynomial a = (a0, . . . , aN−1) ∈ R, a sequence of lists
(L0, . . . , LN−d+1) of bit pattern locations of a binary polynomial b
Output: c = ab mod q
1: create zero polynomial c = (c0, . . . , cN−1) . holds the result
2: create zero polynomial P = (P0, . . . , PN−1) . holds a pattern polynomial
3: for all l > 0 such that Ll is not empty do . process patterns
4: for j from 0 to N − 1 do . compute pattern polynomial P = a+X la
5: set Pj ← aj + al+j mod N
6: let dl denote the size of Ll . get number of occurrences of this pattern
7: for j from 0 to dl − 1 do . multiply using the pattern polynomial
8: for k from 0 to N − 1 do
9: cLl[j]+k mod N ← cLl[j]+k mod N + Pk
10: if L0 is not empty then . treat possibly remaining single coeﬃcient
11: for k from 0 to N − 1 do
12: cL0[0]+k mod N ← cL0[0]+k mod N + ak
13: for i from 0 to N − 1 do . reduce coeﬃcients modulo q
14: set ci ← ci mod q
15: return c . return result
remaining single degree stored in L0 is treated separately without computing a
pattern polynomial. The detailed description of the algorithm can be found in
Algorithm 4.2.
If no bit pattern occurs more than once in b, the algorithm requires dN
additions over Z. This is the worst case. Let dl denote the number of occurrences
of the bit pattern with length l in b. For each bit pattern with dl > 1, the
required number of additions is reduced by (dl − 1)N .
Additionally, N reductions modulo q are performed. The algorithm requires
memory for storing two polynomials (the result polynomial and a pattern poly-
nomial).
4.2.3 Timings and comparison
In this section, we state the results of the performance measurements of the
multiplication algorithms of Bailey et al., Lee et al. [45], and our proposed
algorithm.
The measurement results are summarized in Table 4.1. Column Parameter
set denotes the used parameter set. Column tBailey denotes the multiplication
algorithm of Bailey et al., column tLee denotes the algorithm of Lee et al., and
column tpattern denotes our proposed pattern multiplication algorithm. The
stated times are average times taken over 1.000.000 multiplications of randomly
40
Chapter 4. Eﬃciency improvements for NTRU
chosen polynomials for each parameter set. The experiments were made using a
computer equipped with a Pentium M 1.6 GHz CPU, 2 GB of RAM and running
Microsoft Windows XP.
For the algorithm of Lee et al. and our proposed algorithm, the pattern
ﬁnding and precomputation steps are taken into account. For these two algo-
rithms, the speedup relative to Bailey et al.'s algorithm is given in addition to
the absolute times.
Parameter set tBailey tLee tpattern
ees251ep6 0.10 ms 0.09 ms (-10%) 0.08 ms (-20%)
ees347ep2 0.19 ms 0.17 ms (-11%) 0.14 ms (-26%)
ees397ep1 0.24 ms 0.21 ms (-12%) 0.17 ms (-29%)
ees491ep1 0.37 ms 0.31 ms (-16%) 0.25 ms (-32%)
ees587ep1 0.52 ms 0.43 ms (-17%) 0.34 ms (-35%)
ees787ep1 0.89 ms 0.73 ms (-18%) 0.56 ms (-37%)
Table 4.1: Timings of the diﬀerent multiplication algorithms
Finally, we would like to remark that the precomputation scenario presented
by Lee et al. is not always applicable to NTRU. During encryption, it applies
only when sending many messages to a single receiver. During decryption, it
only applies to one of the two multiplications involved. We therefore propose to
use a hybrid solution between the approach of Lee et al. and the one we present
in this chapter.
4.3 Speciﬁcation and implementation
In this section, we provide details of our NTRUSVES implementation. First,
we describe the instantiation of SVES-3 given in IEEE P1363.1. Afterwards,
we describe the supported parameters, the format of the keys, and the encoding
format of polynomials and keys.
4.3.1 Instantiation
IEEE P1363.1 proposes concrete instantiations of the hash functions G and H
used in the NAEP/SVES-3 scheme. The hash function G is called Blinding
Value Generation Method (BVGM) (in draft 8) or Blinding Polynomial Gener-
ation Method (BPGM) (in draft 9). We decide to use the latter notation for the
rest of the chapter. The BPGM itself uses a so-called Seed Expansion Function
(SEF) (draft 8) or Index Generation Function (IGF) (draft 9), which in turn
uses a hash function. Again, we use the latter name for the rest of the chapter.
The draft standard proposes two diﬀerent BPGM instantiations. The ﬁrst
one (LBP-BPGM1) is used to generate a binary blinding polynomial, the second
one (LBP-BPGM2) produces a product form blinding polynomial. Both use the
same IGF (IGF-MGF1). The underlying hash function is either SHA-1 or SHA-
256 for the proposed parameter sets (see Section 4.3.2).
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Let hTrunc be some bits of the encoded public key h. The input string
(ID ||m||b) for the BPGM can be extended to (ID ||m||b||hTrunc). Although
this option is not used with the proposed parameter sets (i.e., the length of
hTrunc is 0), it is supported by our implementation (see also Section 4.3.3).
The function H is called Mask Generation Function (MGF) and uses a hash
function. The draft standard proposes one instantiation (MGF1) which uses
either SHA-1 or SHA-256 as hash function.
We do not describe the BPGM, IGF, and MGF algorithms in this chapter,
but rather refer the reader to [35]. Our implementation follows the description
of the algorithms of draft 8 precisely.
4.3.2 Parameters
Our implementation supports all recommended parameter sets of draft version 9
of IEEE P1363.1 (see Annex A.5 of the draft standard). For each choice of the
main parameter N ∈ {251, 347, 397, 491, 587, 787}, there is a binary and a
product form parameter set. The parameter choices correspond to bit security
levels of 80, 112, 128, 160, 192, and 256 bits, respectively. Each parameter set
is chosen to maximize eﬃciency for the selected security level.
4.3.3 Keys
The name of the parameter set used to generate the keys is stored in both the
public private key.
Public key
The public key is the polynomial h = f−1pg mod q.
Private key
Diﬀering from the draft standard, we do not store the polynomial f as the
private key. Instead, the pair of polynomials (F, g) is stored, where F either
is a binary or a product form polynomial, and g is a binary polynomial. On
the one hand, this speeds up decryption (see Section 4.3.4) and reduces the
size of the encoded private key (see Section 4.3.6). On the other hand, the
public polynomial h is needed to generate the input to the Blinding Polynomial
Generation Method (see Section 4.3.1), so it must be possible to reconstruct h
from the private key.
4.3.4 Decryption
The central decryption operation is the computation of the polynomial
a = fe mod q,
where f = 1 + pF is the private polynomial. Since in our implementation,
the (binary or product form) polynomial F is stored in the private key (see
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Section 4.3.3), this computation is performed as
a = e+ peF mod q,
using the eﬃcient multiplication algorithms described in Section 4.3.5 for the
computation of eF .
4.3.5 Eﬃcient multiplication
We employ the pattern multiplication algorithm proposed in this chapter to
compute the product of polynomials in R with binary polynomials. For the
product form variant, the algorithm of Bailey et al. is used, which is described
in Section 6.2.6 of IEEE P1363.1-D9.
4.3.6 Encoding
Several steps of the encryption and decryption processes require the encoding
of polynomials as (and the decoding from) octet strings. Additionally, in order
to use the keys in public-key infrastructures, they have to be encoded as well.
In the following sections, we describe the encoding format of polynomials and
keys.
Binary polynomials
Sparse binary polynomials are stored as a sorted array of the degrees of their
monomials. The degrees are encoded in ascending order. Each degree is an
integer in the interval [0, N − 1], which is encoded as an octet string (byte
array) of length dlog256(N − 1)e in big endian byte order. Non-sparse binary
polynomials are encoded using the BRE2OSP primitive described in Section
7.7.1 of IEEE P1363.1-D8.
Product form polynomials
A product form polynomial f = f1f2+f3 consists of three sparse binary polyno-
mials with the same number of non-zero coeﬃcients. Product form polynomials
are encoded as the concatenation of the encodings of f1, f2, and f3 (see the
preceding paragraph).
Other ring elements
Since all ring computations are performed modulo q, ring elements are stored
as their coeﬃcient vector with coeﬃcients reduced modulo q. The ring elements
are encoded using the RE2OSP primitive described in Section 7.5.1 of IEEE
P1363.1-D8.
NTRUSVES keys
NTRUSVES keys are encoded as ASN.1 structures [41] in order to be used
in public-key infrastructures. The polynomials are encoded as octet strings as
43
4.4. Timings and comparison
described in the preceding sections. The NTRUSVES public and private key
ASN.1 structures are
NTRUSVESPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
paramName IA5STRING -- parameter set name
encH OCTET STRING -- encoded polynomial h
}
NTRUSVESPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
paramName IA5STRING -- parameter set name
encF OCTET STRING -- encoded polynomial F
encG OCTET STRING -- encoded polynomial g
}
The public key structure is embedded into a SubjectPublicKeyInfo struc-
ture as deﬁned in RFC 3280 [36]. The private key structure is embedded into a
PrivateKeyInfo structure as deﬁned in PKCS #8 [61].
4.4 Timings and comparison
In this section, we state the experimental results of the measurements of our
NTRUSVES implementation. We provide timings as well as key sizes for all
parameter sets proposed by IEEE P1363.1-D9. We also provide similar results
for the RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 encryption scheme and compare the complexity of
the two encryption schemes based on these experiments.
NTRUSVES
The measurement results of our NTRUSVES implementation are summarized
in Table 4.2. Column Parameter set denotes the used parameter set. The
ﬁrst six parameter sets are binary parameter sets, the other six sets are product
form parameter sets. Column k denotes the bit security level of NTRUSVES
with the given parameter set. The estimates are taken from IEEE P1363.1-D9.
Columns sprivKey and spubKey denote the size of the DER-encoded private
and public key ASN.1 structures, respectively (see Section 4.3.6). Columns
tkpg, tenc, and tdec denote the timings for key pair generation, encryption,
and decryption, respectively.
The experiments were made using a computer equipped with a Pentium M
1.6 GHz CPU, 2 GB of RAM and running Microsoft Windows XP. The code
was compiled with JDK 1.3 and run under JRE 1.6.
For the binary parameters sets, the pattern multiplication algorithm pro-
posed in this chapter has been used. For each parameter set, 500 key pairs were
generated. For each key pair, 2000 random messages of random length between
1 and the maximal possible length were encrypted and decrypted.
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Parameter set k spubKey sprivKey tkpg tenc tdec
ees251ep6 80 296 bytes 218 bytes 16.8 ms 0.2 ms 0.2 ms
ees347ep2 112 740 bytes 529 bytes 26.6 ms 0.3 ms 0.4 ms
ees397ep1 128 840 bytes 595 bytes 34.3 ms 0.3 ms 0.5 ms
ees491ep1 160 1028 bytes 723 bytes 50.5 ms 0.5 ms 0.7 ms
ees587ep1 192 1220 bytes 853 bytes 70.9 ms 0.6 ms 1.0 ms
ees787ep1 256 1620 bytes 1118 bytes 126.5 ms 1.0 ms 1.5 ms
ees251ep7 80 548 bytes 194 bytes 14.9 ms 0.1 ms 0.2 ms
ees347ep3 112 740 bytes 462 bytes 27.7 ms 0.2 ms 0.3 ms
ees397ep2 128 840 bytes 518 bytes 35.6 ms 0.2 ms 0.3 ms
ees491ep2 160 1028 bytes 630 bytes 53.6 ms 0.3 ms 0.5 ms
ees587ep2 192 1220 bytes 738 bytes 74.8 ms 0.5 ms 0.7 ms
ees787ep2 256 1620 bytes 969 bytes 131.7 ms 0.7 ms 1.1 ms
Table 4.2: Timings and key sizes of NTRUSVES
RSA according to PKCS #1 v2.1
In this section, we state the results of the measurements of our implementation
of the RSA encryption scheme according to PKCS #1 v2.1 [64]. The implemen-
tation is part of the open source Java cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22].
The implementation uses the built-in modular arithmetic of Java (provided by
the BigInteger class). The results are summarized in Table 4.3.
Column Key size denotes the bit size of the modulus. Column k denotes
the bit security level of RSA for the given key size. The estimates are taken from
the NIST Key Management Guideline [55]. Columns sprivKey and spubKey
denote the size of the DER-encoded private and public key ASN.1 structures,
respectively. Columns tkpg, tenc, and tdec denote the timings for key pair
generation, encryption, and decryption, respectively.
For each key size, 50 key pairs were generated. The public exponent was
chosen as e = 216 + 1 for all key sizes and key pairs. For each key pair, 1000
random messages of random length between 1 and the maximal possible length
were encrypted and decrypted.
Key size k spubKey sprivKey tkpg tenc tdec
1024 80 162 bytes 634 bytes 0.7 sec 0.7 ms 13.2 ms
2048 112 194 bytes 1218 bytes 8.6 sec 2.7 ms 91.7 ms
3072 128 422 bytes 1794 bytes 27.3 sec 5.9 ms 294.4 ms
4096 144 550 bytes 2374 bytes 104.1 sec 10.3 ms 682.5 ms
Table 4.3: Timings and key sizes of RSA according to PKCS #1 v2.1
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Comparison
The timings given in the preceding sections show that the NTRUSVES key
pair generation, encryption and decryption operations are substantially faster
than their RSA counterparts for the same security level. This is true also for
larger choices of the security parameter because the asymptotic complexity of
NTRUSVES grows slower in terms of the security parameter than the complex-
ity of RSA.
For the same security level, the size of NTRUSVES private keys is about
1/3 of the size of RSA private keys. NTRUSVES public keys are about twice
as large as RSA public keys.
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McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
In 1978, McEliece proposed the ﬁrst encryption scheme which is based on error-
correcting codes [48]. The encryption scheme uses Goppa codes, which were
deﬁned by V. D. Goppa in 1970 [31]. We refer to this encryption scheme as the
McEliece PKCS. For appropriate choices of the parameters, the McEliece PKCS
remains secure against key recovery and ciphertext only attacks. However, the
original McEliece PKCS is not secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(CCA2 secure).
There exist several variants of the McEliece PKCS which achieve CCA2 se-
curity. In [44], Kobara and Imai observed that the generic CCA2 conversions
by Pointcheval [59] and by Fujisaki and Okamoto [23] can be applied to the
McEliece PKCS. Furthermore, they propose three conversions speciﬁcally tai-
lored to the McEliece cryptosystem. Their main concern is to decrease the data
overhead introduced by the previously mentioned conversions. The γ-conversion
of Kobara and Imai oﬀers the best information rate (i.e., the ratio between the
plaintext and ciphertext size) of all these conversions. We refer to this conver-
sion as the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS.
The McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS is a promising candidate for a quantum-
immune encryption scheme. For a comprehensive discussion of its security, we
refer the reader to [20].
In this chapter, we describe the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS. We show how
to modify the original McEliece PKCS to achieve signiﬁcantly reduced key sizes.
This idea was ﬁrst described in [20]. Based on a collaboration with Raphael
Overbeck, we describe how to speed up the decoding algorithm for Goppa codes.
Afterwards, we present a highly eﬃcient Java implementation of the McEliece
Kobara-Imai PKCS that incorporates the above-mentioned optimizations. The
implementation is compliant with the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA)
[75] and is part of the open source Java cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22].
Finally, we present timings of our implementation and compare the McEliece
Kobara-Imai PKCS with the RSA encryption scheme.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.1, we give a brief introduc-
tion to error-correcting codes. In Section 5.2, we describe the original McEliece
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PKCS, the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS, and the optimized decoding algorithm
for Goppa codes. In Section 5.3, we give details of our implementation of the
McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS. Section 5.4 presents our timings of the McEliece
Kobara-Imai PKCS including a comparison with the RSA encryption scheme.
5.1 Mathematical background
In this section, we provide the mathematical background needed to understand
the rest of the chapter. We give a brief introduction to error correcting codes.
We then deﬁne Goppa codes and describe an eﬃcient decoding algorithm for
these codes.
5.1.1 Error correcting codes
An (n, k)-code C over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F is a k-dimensional subspace of the vector
space Fn. We call C an (n, k, d)-code if the minimum Hamming distance of two
code words of C is d. The Hamming distance of an element x ∈ Fn to the zero
vector is called the weight of x. The value t = b(d − 1)/2c is called the error
correcting capacity of C, and C is said to be a t-error correcting code. A matrix
G ∈ Fk×n is a generator matrix for C if the rows of G span C over F. A matrix
H ∈ F(n−k)×n is called a check matrix for C if H> is the right kernel of C.
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn and J = {j1, . . . , jm} be an ordered subset of
{1, . . . , n}. By x.J , we denote the vector (xj1 , . . . , xjm) ∈ Fm. Similarly, for a
k× n matrix M , by M.J we denote the matrix consisting of the column vectors
of M with the indices given by J .
5.1.2 Goppa codes
Goppa codes were deﬁned by V. D. Goppa in 1970 [31]. For this code class, there
exist eﬃcient error correcting algorithms. Goppa codes are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 8 (Goppa codes) Let g(X) ∈ F2m [X] be a monic irreducible poly-
nomial of degree t. Let n = 2m, L = (γ0, . . . , γn−1) be an enumeration of the
elements of F2m , and c be an element of {0, 1}n. The syndrome of c is deﬁned
as the polynomial
Sc(X) =
n−1∑
i=0
ci
g(X)− g(γi)
g(γi) · (X − γi) mod g(X). (5.1)
Then, the set
G = {c ∈ {0, 1}n | Sc(X) = 0}
is an (n, k, 2t+ 1)-code over F2m . It is uniquely determined by the polynomial
g(X) and the enumeration L. The polynomial g(X) is called a Goppa polynomial
and the code G is called a (binary irreducible) Goppa code generated by g(X).
Using the Goppa polynomial g(X) and the enumeration L of F2m , deﬁne the
following matrices:
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X =

gt 0 0 . . . 0
gt−1 gt 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
g1 g2 g3 . . . gt
, Y =

1 1 . . . 1
γ0 γ1 . . . γn−1
...
...
. . .
...
γt−10 γ
t−1
1 . . . γ
t−1
n−1
, and
Z =

g(γ0)−1 0 . . . 0
0 g(γ1)−1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 . . . 0 g(γn−1)−1
.
A check matrix H of G can be computed as H = XY Z. This representation
is called the canonical form.
5.1.3 Eﬃcient decoding of Goppa codes
Let c = x + z, where x ∈ G and z is a vector of length n and weight at most
t. Then x and z are uniquely determined by c and G and may be found using
Patterson's algorithm [58]. This fast syndrome decoding algorithm consists of
ﬁve main steps:
1. Compute the syndrome Sc(X) of c. If it is zero, z = 0 and x = c.
2. Set τ(X) =
√
S−1c (X) +X mod g(X) (note that the square root is well
deﬁned).
3. Solve the equation β(X)τ(X) ≡ α(X) mod g(X) such that deg(α(X)) ≤
bt/2c and deg(β(X)) ≤ b(t− 1)/2c (there exists a unique solution).
4. Compute the zeroes of σ(X) = α2(X) + Xβ2(X) by enumeration. The
positions of the zeroes of σ(X) in L correspond to the non-zero entries
of z.
5. Finally, the vector x is computed as x = c+ z.
If the check matrix is given in canonical form, the syndrome of c can be
computed as Sc(X) = Hc> in Step 1. In Step 2, the square root may be
computed with Shanks' algorithm [70] or according to the IEEE 1363 standard
[39]. To solve the equation in Step 3, the extended Euclidean algorithm is used.
The theoretical runtime of Patterson's algorithm to correct errors in Goppa
codes is O(n · t ·m2) binary operations.
5.2 The McEliece PKCS and its variants
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the basic McEliece PKCS in its original
form. We then show how to signiﬁcantly reduce the key sizes for the CCA2
secure variants of the McEliece PKCS and describe the γ-conversion of Kobara
and Imai, which is the variant that oﬀers the best information rate of all CCA2
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secure conversions. We refer to this conversion as the McEliece Kobara-Imai
PKCS. Finally, we describe how to speed up the decoding algorithm for Goppa
codes (see Section 5.1.3).
5.2.1 The original McEliece PKCS
We give a brief description of the original McEliece PKCS:
System parameters: n = 2m, t ∈ N, where t n
Key pair generation: Set k = n−mt and generate the following matrices:
G′: k × n generator matrix of a binary irre-
ducible (n, k, 2t+ 1) Goppa code G
S: k × k random binary non-singular matrix
P : n× n random permutation matrix
Then, compute the k × n matrix G = SG′P .
Public key: the generator matrix G.
Private key: (S,DG , P ), where DG is an eﬃcient decoding algorithm for G.
Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}k, randomly choose a vector
z ∈ {0, 1}n of weight t and compute the ciphertext c = mG⊕ z.
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}n, compute cP−1 = mSG′ ⊕
zP−1 and apply the decoding algorithmDG to it. Since cP−1 has hamming
distance t from the Goppa code G, we obtain the codeword
mSG′ = DG(cP−1).
Let J = {j1, . . . , jk} be an ordered subset of {1, . . . , n} such that G′.J is
invertible. Then, the plaintext is computed as
m = (mSG′).J(G′.J)
−1S−1
5.2.2 The McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
Reducing key sizes
For all CCA2 secure conversions of the McEliece PKCS, it is possible to sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the key sizes and speed up the decryption process by using
a generator matrix G′ of a special form. We describe the adjusted McEliece
PKCS:
System parameters: n = 2m, t ∈ N, where t n
Key pair generation: The following steps are performed:
• Compute the canonical mt× n check matrix H as described in Sec-
tion 5.1.1.
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• Choose a random n-permutation P and computeHP . Check whether
the leftmt×mt submatrix of HP is invertible. If not, choose another
permutation P .
• Let S−1 denote the left mt ×mt submatrix of HP . Compute S =
(S−1)−1 and H ′ = SHP . Then, H ′ is of the form H ′ = (Idmt|R),
where R is amt×(n−mt) matrix. The matrixH ′ is called systematic
check matrix.
• Compute the systematic generator matrix G′ = (R>|Idk), where
k = n−mt. The matrix R> is called the redundant part of G′.
Public key: the redundant part R> of the generator matrix G′.
Private key: (DG , P ), where DG is an eﬃcient decoding algorithm for the
Goppa code G generated by G′.
Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}k using a given error vector z ∈
{0, 1}n of weight t, compute the ciphertext c = mG′⊕z = m(R>|Idk)⊕ z.
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}n, compute cP−1 and apply the
decoding algorithm DG to it. Since cP−1 has hamming distance t from
the Goppa code G, we obtain the codeword mG′ and the error vector z.
Since G′ is of the form (R>|Idk), the plaintextm is obtained by extracting
the last k columns of mG′.
We refer to the adjusted McEliece encryption and decryption operations as
the McEliece CCA2 encryption and decryption primitives, respectively.
Remark. It may be the case that the number of rows of the systematic check
matrix H ′ is less than mt. In this case, the number of rows of G′ is larger than
n − mt. Nevertheless, only the ﬁrst k = n − mt rows of G′ are used. Since
the code deﬁned by this reduced generator matrix is a subcode of the code
deﬁned by the full generator matrix, this does not aﬀect the correctness of the
encryption and decryption operations.
The McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
To explain the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS, we introduce the following nota-
tion:
H cryptographic hash function, outputting bit strings of
length ≤ blog2
(
n
t
)c
R cryptographically secure pseudo-random number gen-
erator
Conv bijective conversion of any number in {0, . . . , (nt)− 1}
to an error vector of length n and weight t
E the McEliece CCA2 encryption primitive
D the McEliece CCA2 decryption primitive
MSBn(m) the n most signiﬁcant bits of a bit string m
LSBn(m) the n least signiﬁcant bits of a bit string m
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The encryption process of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS is described in
Algorithm 5.1. The decryption process is described in Algorithm 5.2.
Algorithm 5.1 McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS encryption
System parameters: the McEliece parameters n = 2m, k, and t, the hash
function H, the pseudo-random number generator R, and a predetermined
public constant const
Input: a random number r and the plaintext p. It is assumed that the plaintext
is prepared such that Len(p) ≥ blog2
(
n
t
)c+ k − Len(const)− Len(r).
Output: a McEliece-based ciphertext c
1: compute c1 = R(r)⊕ (p||const)
2: compute c2 = r ⊕H(c1)
3: set c3 = LSBblog2 (nt)c+k(c2||c1)
4: set c4 = LSBk(c3)
5: set c5 = MSBblog2 (nt)c(c3)
6: compute z = Conv(c5)
7: set l = Len(c2||c1)− blog2
(
n
t
)c − k
8: if l > 0 then
9: set c6 = MSB l(c2||c1)
10: else
11: c6 is the empty string
12: compute c = (c6||E(c4, z)
13: return c
5.2.3 Speeding up the decoding algorithm
The two most time-consuming steps in Patterson's decoding algorithm (see Sec-
tion 5.1.1) are the computation of the syndrome of a vector and the computation
of the square root of an element of F(2m)t . It is possible to speed up these com-
putations by storing additional information as part of the private key. In the
following paragraphs, we describe these time-memory tradeoﬀs.
Computing syndromes
As noted in Section 5.1.1, the syndrome Sc(X) of a vector c ∈ {0, 1}n can either
be computed according to Equation 5.1, or by multiplying c> with the check
matrix H in canonical form. The second variant is much faster. Our experi-
ments show that for the McEliece parameters (m, t) = (11, 50), computing the
syndrome as in Equation 5.1 takes about 940 ms, while computing it by multi-
plying c> with H takes only 0.6 ms. In our implementation, we use the latter
option. The check matrix H in canonical form is stored as part of the private
key (see Section 5.3.3). For the above parameters, the size of the canonical
check matrix is 68.8 KB.
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Algorithm 5.2 McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS decryption
System parameters: the McEliece parameters n = 2m and t, the hash func-
tion H, the pseudo-random number generator R, and the predetermined
public constant const
Input: a ciphertext c, the predetermined public constant const , and the bit
length Len(r) of the random number r used during encryption
Output: the plaintext p, or REJECT
1: set c6 = MSBLen(c)−n(c) (may be the empty string)
2: compute (c4, z) = D(LSBn(c))
3: compute c5 = Conv−1(z)
4: set c2 = MSBLen(r)(c6||c5||c4)
5: set c1 = LSBLen(c)−Len(r)(c6||c5||c4)
6: compute r′ = c2 ⊕H(c1)
7: compute (p||const ′) = c1 ⊕R(r′)
8: if const ′ 6= const then
9: return REJECT
10: else
11: return p
Computing square roots
The square root of an element α ∈ F(2m)t can be computed using Shanks'
algorithm [70]. This algorithm relies on the fact that since the order of α is a
power of two, the square root of α can be computed by repeated squaring of α.
Our experiments show that for the McEliece parameters (m, t) = (11, 50), this
method takes about 950 ms on average. We use the following method to speed
up this computation.
Using the Goppa polynomial g(X), compute the t× t-matrix
Q =
(
X mod g(X) X2 mod g(X) . . . X2(t−1) mod g(X)
)
over F2m . With this matrix, the square of an element α = (α0, . . . , αt−1) ∈
F(2m)t can be computed as α2 = Qα′, where α′ is obtained by squaring each
coeﬃcient of α in F2m :
α′ = (α20, . . . , α
2
t−1).
Given the matrix Q, the square root of an element β ∈ F(2m)t can be determined
by computing
β′ = (β′0, . . . , β
′
t−1) = Q
−1β
and taking the square root of each coeﬃcient of β′:√
β = (
√
β′0, . . . ,
√
β′t−1).
So, in order to compute the square root of β, it suﬃces to compute t square roots
over the (much smaller) ﬁeld F2m and the product of the t× t-matrix Q−1 and a
vector of length t over F2m . For the McEliece parameters (m, t) = (11, 50), this
method takes about 0.7 ms. The matrix Q−1 is stored as part of the private key
(see Section 5.3.3). For the above parameters, the size of this matrix is 3.1 KB.
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5.3 Speciﬁcation and implementation
5.3.1 Parameters
The main parameters of the McEliece primitive are the extension degree m of
the ﬁeld F2m and the error correcting capacity t of the Goppa code. From these
parameters, the length n = 2m and the dimension k = n − mt of the code
are computed. Our implementation supports extension degrees up to m = 31.
Proposed parameter sets are summarized in Table 5.1. Columns m and t
denote the McEliece parameters described above. Column Bit security denotes
the bit security level of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS with the corresponding
parameter set. The estimates of the bit security level are taken from [68].
m t Bit security
11 25 80
11 50 105
11 70 110
12 38 128
12 48 144
Table 5.1: Proposed parameter sets for the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
Additional parameters for the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS are the hash
function H and the pseudo-random number generator R. Our implementation
supports all important hash functions such as the SHA family and the RIPEMD
family. Other hash functions can easily be integrated. As pseudo-random num-
ber generator, we use the hash-based construction described in FIPS 186-2 [53].
5.3.2 Finite ﬁelds, vectors, and matrices
Finite ﬁelds
The ﬁeld F2m is identiﬁed with F2[Y ]/〈f(Y )〉 for an irreducible polynomial
f(Y ) ∈ F2[Y ] of degree m (called the ﬁeld polynomial). The elements of F2m are
represented by polynomials over F2[Y ] of degree less thanm. These polynomials
and the ﬁeld polynomial f(Y ) are represented by their coeﬃcient vectors. Since
for all practicable parameter sets, m is less than 32, the coeﬃcient vectors can
be stored using Java's primitive int type, whose size is 32 bits.
Our implementation provides methods for the addition and multiplication
of elements of F2m as well as methods for computing inverses and computing
square roots (see Section 5.2.3).
The ﬁeld F(2m)t is identiﬁed with F2m [X]/〈g(X)〉, where g(X) ∈ F2m [X] is
the irreducible Goppa polynomial of degree t deﬁning the Goppa code. The
elements of F(2m)t are represented by polynomials over F2m [X] of degree less
than t. These polynomials and the ﬁeld polynomial g(X) are represented by
their coeﬃcient vectors. As described in the last paragraph, each coeﬃcient is
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of the primitive int type, so the coeﬃcient vector is stored as an int array.
Leading zero coeﬃcients are omitted in order to reduce the required space.
Our implementation provides methods for the addition and multiplication
of elements of F(2m)t as well as methods for computing inverses and computing
square roots (see Section 5.2.3). It also provides methods for testing polynomials
for irreducibility, for evaluating polynomials, and for computing the greatest
common divisor of two polynomials.
Vectors, matrices, and permutations
Several types of vectors and matrices are used. The message vectors, error
vectors, and ciphertext vectors are vectors over F2. The coeﬃcient vectors of
elements of F(2m)t are vectors over F2m . The generator matrix of the Goppa
code is a matrix over F2. The check matrix of the code is generated as a matrix
over F2m and interpreted as a matrix over F2 when computing syndromes of
vectors over F2. The matrix used to compute square roots in F(2m)t is a matrix
over F2m .
Vectors over F2 are stored as int arrays, where each int represents 32 co-
eﬃcients of the vector. Matrices over F2 are stored as an array of their row
vectors. Vectors over F2m are stored as int arrays, where each int represents
one element of the vector. The check matrix H over F2m is stored as an array
of its row vectors. The matrix Q−1 used to compute square roots over F(2m)t is
stored as an array of its column vectors.
The n-permutation P which is part of the private key is stored as a permuta-
tion vector. Each element of the permutation vector is an element in [0, . . . , n−1]
and is stored as an int.
5.3.3 Key pairs
Public key
The public key consists of the parameters n and t and the systematic generator
matrix G′.
Private key
The private key consists of the parameters n and k, the ﬁeld polynomial describ-
ing the ﬁnite ﬁeld F2m (and determining the extension degree m), the Goppa
polynomial generating the code, the permutation P , the canonical check ma-
trix H, and the matrix Q−1 used to compute square roots over F(2m)t (see
Section 5.2.3).
5.3.4 Encoding
In order to use the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS in public-key infrastructures,
the keys have to be encoded in suitable data structures. Since the keys contain
ﬁeld polynomials, matrices, and permutations (see Section 5.3.3), these elements
have to be encoded as well. In the following sections, we describe the used
encoding formats.
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Finite ﬁelds
Field polynomials and Goppa polynomials are encoded as octet strings. These
octet string representations are obtained from the int or int[] representations
(see Section 5.3.2) by converting each int into an octet string of minimal length
in little-endian byte order. For arrays, also the length of the array is encoded
as an octet string of length four.
Matrices and permutations
Matrices and permutations also are encoded as octet strings. Only the encoding
of matrices over F2 is required. Each row vector of these matrices is encoded as
an octet string as described in the preceding section. The encodings of the row
vectors are concatenated into a single octet string. Additionally, the number
of rows and columns are encoded as octet strings of length four in little-endian
byte order.
Permutations are also represented as int arrays (see Section 5.3.2). These
arrays are encoded as octet strings as described above.
Keys
McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS keys are encoded as ASN.1 structures [41] in order
to be used in public-key infrastructures. Field polynomials, matrices, and per-
mutations are encoded as octet strings as described in the preceding sections.
The McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS public and private key ASN.1 structures are
McElieceKobaraImaiPKCSPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
n INTEGER -- length of the code
t INTEGER -- error correcting capacity of the code
G OCTET STRING -- encoded systematic generator matrix G
}
McElieceKobaraImaiPKCSPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
n INTEGER -- length of the code
k INTEGER -- dimension of the code
fieldPoly OCTET STRING -- encoded field polynomial
goppaPoly OCTET STRING -- encoded Goppa polynomial
P OCTET STRING -- encoded permutation P
H OCTET STRING -- encoded canonical check matrix H
QInv OCTET STRING -- encoded matrix Q^{-1}
}
The public key structure is embedded into a SubjectPublicKeyInfo struc-
ture as deﬁned in RFC 3280 [36]. The private key structure is embedded into a
PrivateKeyInfo structure as deﬁned in PKCS #8 [61].
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Object Identiﬁers (OIDs)
The OID preﬁx assigned to the CCA2 secure conversions of the McEliece PKCS
is
1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.4.2.
This OID is stored in both the SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PrivateKeyInfo
structures (see the preceding section). The OID of the McEliece Kobara-Imai
PKCS is
1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.1.3.4.2.3.
5.4 Timings and comparison
In this section, we state the experimental results of the measurements of our
implementation of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS. We provide timings as well
as key sizes for various bit security levels. We also provide similar results for
the RSA PKCS #1 v2.1 encryption scheme and compare the complexity of the
two encryption schemes based on these experiments.
McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
In our experiments, we use SHA-256 as hash function for the McEliece Kobara-
Imai PKCS. The timings are summarized in Table 5.2. Column Parameter
set denotes the used parameter set, consisting of the McEliece parameters
(m, t). Column k denotes the bit security level of the McEliece Kobara-Imai
PKCS with the given parameter set (see Section 5.3.1). Columns sprivKey and
spubKey denote the size of the DER-encoded private and public key ASN.1
structures, respectively (see Section 5.3.3). Columns tkpg, tenc, and tdec
denote the timings for key pair generation, encryption, and decryption, respec-
tively.
For each parameter set, 50 key pairs were generated. For each key pair, 250
random messages of length 32 were encrypted and decrypted. The experiments
were made using a computer equipped with a Pentium M 1.6 GHz CPU, 2 GB
of RAM and running Microsoft Windows XP. The code was compiled with JDK
1.3 and run under JRE 1.6.
Parameter set k spubKey sprivKey tkpg tenc tdec
(11, 25) 80 60.6 KB 73.7 KB 0.8 sec 2.8 ms 20.0 ms
(11, 50) 105 100.1 KB 144.8 KB 3.8 sec 3.6 ms 40.6 ms
(11, 70) 110 121.1 KB 202.9 KB 8.1 sec 4.2 ms 58.9 ms
(12, 38) 128 202.7 KB 238.0 KB 3.1 sec 6.5 ms 62.4 ms
(12, 48) 144 247.5 KB 299.1 KB 5.3 sec 7.2 ms 79.5 ms
Table 5.2: Timings and key sizes of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
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RSA according to PKCS #1 v2.1
In this section, we state the results of the measurements of our implementation
of the RSA encryption scheme according to PKCS #1 v2.1 [64]. The implemen-
tation is part of the open source Java cryptographic library FlexiProvider [22].
The implementation uses the built-in modular arithmetic of Java (provided by
the BigInteger class). The results are summarized in Table 5.3. This table can
also be found in Section 4.4.
Column Key size denotes the bit size of the modulus. Column k denotes
the bit security level of RSA for the given key size. The estimates are taken from
the NIST Key Management Guideline [55]. Columns sprivKey and spubKey
denote the size of the DER-encoded private and public key ASN.1 structures,
respectively. Columns tkpg, tenc, and tdec denote the timings for key pair
generation, encryption, and decryption, respectively.
For each key size, 50 key pairs were generated. The public exponent was
chosen as e = 216 + 1 for all key sizes and key pairs. For each key pair, 1000
random messages of random length between 1 and the maximal possible length
were encrypted and decrypted.
Key size k spubKey sprivKey tkpg tenc tdec
1024 80 162 bytes 634 bytes 0.7 sec 0.7 ms 13.2 ms
2048 112 194 bytes 1218 bytes 8.6 sec 2.7 ms 91.7 ms
3072 128 422 bytes 1794 bytes 27.3 sec 5.9 ms 294.4 ms
4096 144 550 bytes 2374 bytes 104.1 sec 10.3 ms 682.5 ms
Table 5.3: Timings and key sizes of RSA according to PKCS #1 v2.1
Comparison
The measurement results given in the preceding sections show that the per-
formance of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS key pair generation operation is
comparable to the performance of RSA key pair pair generation for the security
parameters 80 and 112. It is faster than RSA key pair generation for larger
choices of the security parameter.
The performance of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS encryption operation
is about the same as the performance of RSA encryption for all choices of the
security parameter. The McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS decryption operation is
faster than RSA decryption for all choices of the security parameter except for
80 bits.
The asymptotic complexity of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS grows slower
in terms of the security parameter than the complexity of RSA. So, the McEliece
Kobara-Imai PKCS key pair generation, encryption, and decryption operations
are faster than their RSA counterparts for larger choices of the security param-
eter.
The public and private keys of the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS are much
larger than their RSA counterparts. This is true also for larger choices of the
security parameter. However, these key sizes are still reasonable in an end-user
scenario.
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A ﬂexible API for cryptographic
services
Many applications require cryptographic services such as digital signatures, mes-
sage digests, and symmetric and asymmetric encryption. In order to reduce the
complexity of these applications and to enhance security, it is desirable that
the required cryptographic services are not implemented as part of the appli-
cations, but rather are provided by a cryptographic library. It is also desirable
that the applications are independent of speciﬁc cryptographic algorithms and
implementations so that the latter can be easily replaced.
To achieve these goals, a cryptographic API is used. This API provides
interfaces to cryptographic services. Applications use these interfaces to access
the services. They do not need to know about details of the services or their
implementation. On the other hand, implementations of cryptographic services
have to conform to the interfaces deﬁned by the cryptographic API in order to
be used by applications.
The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [75] is such a cryptographic API.
The JCA is part of the Java Standard Edition (SE) platform. It provides crypto-
graphic services to any Java SE application. There exist several cryptographic
libraries which conform to the JCA, such as the providers shipped with the
Java SE platform [76], the FlexiProvider library [22], and the commercial IAIK
Provider [38].
Resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones and PDAs are increas-
ingly used for applications such as mobile commerce and online banking services.
These applications have many security requirements which can be satisﬁed by
using cryptographic services. Most of today's mobile phones and PDAs are ca-
pable of running Java applications. However, they only support the Java Micro
Edition (ME) platform. Since the JCA is not part of Java ME, the support for
cryptographic services is missing for these devices.
In this chapter, we present the FlexiAPI, a cryptographic API which can
be used by any Java application, including Java ME applications. The JCA
has some weaknesses concerning algorithm registration and the design of block
ciphers, modes, and padding schemes. Support for certain important crypto-
graphic services (such as key derivation functions) and the registration of prede-
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ﬁned parameter sets are missing. The FlexiAPI resolves all of these drawbacks.
The FlexiProvider [22] is a large cryptographic library which conforms to the
JCA and recently has been ported to conform to the FlexiAPI. Since there ex-
ist applications which use the FlexiProvider via the JCA, the FlexiAPI is fully
compatible with the JCA on the Java SE platform.
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.1, we describe the design
and drawbacks of the JCA. Section 6.2 speciﬁes the FlexiAPI. In Section 6.3,
we compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two cryptographic APIs. Sec-
tion 6.4 describes applications of the FlexiAPI.
6.1 Design and drawbacks of the JCA
The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [75] is the cryptographic API pro-
vided by the Java SE platform. However, the JCA is not part of the Java
ME platform, so it can not be used for resource-constrained devices such as
mobile phones and PDAs. Also, the JCA has some weaknesses concerning algo-
rithm registration and the design of block ciphers, modes, and padding schemes.
Support for certain important cryptographic services (such as key derivation
functions) and the registration of predeﬁned parameter sets are missing. In
the following sections, we describe the concepts the JCA is based on and the
above-mentioned drawbacks.
6.1.1 Engine concept
For each supported cryptographic service, the JCA provides engine classes pro-
viding the service. All engines are separated into an API class and a Service
Provider Interface (SPI) class. The API classes provide the interfaces used by
applications to access the cryptographic services. The SPI classes deﬁne the
interfaces which implementations of concrete algorithms have to satisfy. It is
not possible for applications to use the algorithms via the SPI classes.
Certain cryptographic services (like key derivation functions) are not sup-
ported by the JCA. The support of ciphers (encryption schemes) does not ac-
count for the conceptual diﬀerences between asymmetric and symmetric ciphers.
For symmetric block ciphers, it is possible to specify a mode and padding scheme
to be used with the block cipher. However, no engine classes exist to specify
interfaces for modes and padding schemes. So, each cryptographic library con-
taining block ciphers has to provide a design of modes and padding schemes
itself.
6.1.2 Algorithm registration and instantiation
When used by applications, cryptographic algorithms are often referenced by a
name or by an Object Identiﬁer (OID). For example, the signatureAlgorithm
ﬁeld of an X.509 certiﬁcate [36] contains the OID of the signature algorithm
used to sign the certiﬁcate. Similarly, the subjectPublicKeyInfo ﬁeld of an
X.509 TBSCertificate contains the OID of the algorithm the key is used with
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(although most applications store the OID of the key). For simplicity, often
symbolic names are used to reference an algorithm (e.g., SHA-1 instead of
1.3.14.3.2.26). Therefore, a cryptographic API has to provide means to reg-
ister names for algorithms and to obtain instances of a class implementing an
algorithm given by its name.
The JCA provides a registration mechanism based on providers. Each
provider provides a set of cryptographic algorithms. This is done by assign-
ing one or more names to classes implementing the algorithm. The JCA does
not check until the instantiation of an algorithm at runtime whether a registered
class implementing an algorithm exists or is of the correct type.
Providers can be registered statically or dynamically so that the provided al-
gorithms can be used by applications. To use certain cryptographic algorithms,
it is necessary that a provider providing the algorithm is digitally signed. The
JCA checks the validity of this code signature when the algorithm is instanti-
ated.
For certain cryptographic algorithms, there exist predeﬁned parameter sets.
For example, the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithms as deﬁned by ANSI
X9.62 [2], IEEE 1363 [39], and SECG SEC 1 [72] require EC domain parameters.
Standardized EC domain parameter sets are deﬁned by ANSI X9.62, SECG
SEC 2 [73], and the ECC brainpool [18], to name a few. The NTRU encryption
scheme as deﬁned by IEEE P1363.1 ([35], see also Chapter 4) also uses predeﬁned
parameter sets given in the draft standard. However, the JCA provides no means
for registering predeﬁned parameter sets.
6.2 Speciﬁcation of the FlexiAPI
6.2.1 Overview
The FlexiAPI is a cryptographic API which can be used by any Java application,
including Java ME applications. It provides a variety of cryptographic services,
including digital signatures, message digests, and symmetric and asymmetric
encryption. For a complete list of cryptographic services supported by the
FlexiAPI, see Table 6.1.
For each supported cryptographic service, the FlexiAPI provides an engine
class providing the service. The FlexiAPI engines are not separated into API
and SPI classes, but instead deﬁne the interfaces used both by applications and
by implementations.
The FlexiAPI is fully compatible with the JCA on the Java SE platform.
This means that an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm which con-
forms to the FlexiAPI can also be used via the JCA with minimal additional
eﬀort (registration of the implementation in a Provider class). The motiva-
tion for this JCA compatibility is that the cryptographic library FlexiProvider
[22] has only recently been ported to conform to the FlexiAPI, but there exist
applications which use the FlexiProvider via the JCA.
61
6.2. Speciﬁcation of the FlexiAPI
Cryptographic service Purpose
AsymmetricBlockCipher asymmetric block ciphers (e.g. RSA)
AsymmetricHybridCipher asymmetric hybrid ciphers (e.g. ECIES)
BlockCipher symmetric block ciphers (e.g. AES)
Mode modes of operation used with block ciphers
(e.g. CBC)
PaddingScheme padding schemes used with block ciphers
(e.g. PKCS #5 padding)
Cipher other ciphers (e.g. PBE)
MessageDigest message digests (e.g. SHA-1)
Mac message authentication codes (e.g. HMac)
SecureRandom secure sources of randomness (e.g. BBS)
Signature digital signatures (e.g. DSA)
KeyAgreement key agreement schemes (e.g. ECDH)
KeyDerivation key derivation functions (e.g. PBKDF2)
AlgorithmParameterSpec algorithm parameters
AlgorithmParameters encoding and decoding of algorithm parame-
ters
AlgorithmParameterGenerator generators for algorithm parameters
SecretKeyGenerator generators for symmetric keys
SecretKeyFactory translation and decoding of symmetric keys
KeyPairGenerator generators for asymmetric key pairs
KeyFactory translation and decoding for asymmetric keys
Table 6.1: Cryptographic services supported by the FlexiAPI
6.2.2 Ciphers
The FlexiAPI supports symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes (ci-
phers). It provides engines for various kinds of ciphers. These engines are
described in the following sections.
Block ciphers, modes, and padding schemes
Block ciphers are symmetric ciphers which are capable of encrypting plaintexts
of arbitrary size by splitting the plaintext into blocks and encrypting blockwise
(cf. [49], Chapter 7). A mode of operation is used to determine the interdepen-
dence of the plaintext and ciphertext blocks. Most modes of operation (such as
CBC, CFB, and OFB) require an initialization vector (IV), some modes (such
as CFB and OFB) use additional parameters. If the plaintext size is not a mul-
tiple of the block size (determined by the mode and block cipher), a padding
scheme is used to extend the plaintext accordingly.
The FlexiAPI deﬁnes engines for block ciphers, modes, and padding schemes.
In the following, we describe the use of these engines. The UML class diagrams
of the BlockCipher, Mode, and PaddingScheme engine classes are given in Fig-
ures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, respectively.
The mode and padding scheme to be used with the block cipher are set with
the setMode() and setPadding() methods, respectively. They are set either
during the instantiation of the block cipher (see Section 6.2.3), or manually at a
later time. The mode and padding scheme may be set only once. Further calls
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BlockCipher
-mode : Mode
-paddingScheme: PaddingScheme
+setMode(modeName : String)
+setPadding(paddingName : String)
+initEncrypt(key : Key, mPar : ModeParameterSpec,
cPar : AlgorithmParameterSpec, sr : SecureRandom)
+initDecrypt(key : Key, mPar : ModeParameterSpec,
cPar : AlgorithmParameterSpec)
+getBlockSize() : int
+update(input : byte[]) : byte[]
+doFinal(input : byte[]) : byte[]
#initCipherEncrypt(key : SecretKey, cPar : AlgorithmParameterSpec)
#initCipherDecrypt(key : SecretKey, cPar : AlgorithmParameterSpec)
#getCipherBlockSize() : int
#singleBlockEncrypt(input : byte[], inOﬀ : int, output : byte[], outOﬀ : int)
#singleBlockDecrypt(input : byte[], inOﬀ : int, output : byte[], outOﬀ : int)
Figure 6.1: BlockCipher UML class diagram
to setMode() and setPadding() are ignored. If a block cipher is used without
specifying a mode or a padding scheme, defaults are automatically chosen by
the BlockCipher engine class. After the mode has been set, the block cipher
passes a reference to itself to the mode with the setBlockCipher() method.
A block cipher is initialized for encryption with the initEncrypt() method.
The key parameter speciﬁes the key to be used for encryption. As noted above,
most modes require an initialization vector (IV) and/or additional parameters.
These mode parameters are speciﬁed with the mPar parameter. Parameters
used by the block cipher are speciﬁed with the cPar parameter. If the block
cipher requires a source of randomness, this source is speciﬁed with the sr pa-
rameter.
Mode
- blockCipher : BlockCipher
#iv : byte[]
#blockSize : int
∼setBlockCipher(blockCipher : blockCipher)
#initEncrypt(key : SecretKey, modeParams : ModeParameterSpec,
cipherParams : AlgorithmParameterSpec)
#initDecrypt(key : SecretKey, modeParams : ModeParameterSpec,
cipherParams : AlgorithmParameterSpec)
#nextChunkEncrypt(input : byte[], inOﬀ : int, output : byte[], outOﬀ : int)
#nextChunkDecrypt(input : byte[], inOﬀ : int, output : byte[], outOﬀ : int)
#reset()
Figure 6.2: Mode UML class diagram
The initEncrypt() method ﬁrst calls the initEncrypt() method of the
mode, forwarding the key, mPar, and cPar parameters. The mode extracts
the parameters it requires from mPar. Then, it initializes the block cipher
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implementation using the initCipherEncrypt() method, forwarding the key
and cPar parameters. Finally, it sets the blockSize attribute. This attribute
usually depends on the block size of the cipher (which can be obtained with
the getCipherBlockSize() method after initialization of the cipher) and/or
the mode parameters. The block cipher forwards the blockSize attribute to the
padding scheme via the setBlockSize() method. Finally, the block size of the
initialized block cipher can be obtained with the getBlockSize() method of the
BlockCipher engine class.
PaddingScheme
#blockSize : int
∼setBlockSize(blockSize : int)
#padLength(inputSize : int)
#pad(input : byte[], inOﬀ : int, inLen : int)
#unPad(input : byte[], inOﬀ : int, inLen : int) : int
Figure 6.3: PaddingScheme UML class diagram
Encryption of a plaintext is done by the update() and doFinal() methods.
The ﬁrst method is used to incrementally specify parts of the plaintext, the sec-
ond method speciﬁes the last part of the plaintext. The block cipher engine class
splits the plaintext into blocks suitable for the mode and pads the plaintext if
necessary. It then forwards the plaintext blocks to the nextChunkEncrypt()
method of the mode for processing, which in turn uses the singleBlockEn-
crypt() method of the block cipher to encrypt the plaintext blocks.
To decrypt a ciphertext, the block cipher is initialized with the initDe-
crypt() method. It calls the initDecrypt() method of the mode, which again
initializes the block cipher implementation using the initCipherEncrypt() or
initCipherDecrypt() methods and sets the blockSize attribute. The block
cipher engine class splits the ciphertext into suitably sized blocks and forwards
them to the nextChunkDecrypt() method of the mode. The mode decrypts
the ciphertext blocks using the singleBlockEncrypt() or singleBlockDe-
crypt() methods of the block cipher (note that some modes such as CFB and
OFB only use the block cipher in encrypt mode). Finally, the block cipher
unpads the ciphertext using the padding scheme.
Asymmetric block ciphers
Asymmetric block ciphers are asymmetric ciphers which are capable of encrypt-
ing plaintexts up to a maximal size. This maximal size usually depends on the
public key used for encryption and parameters of the cipher. The ciphertext is of
a ﬁxed size (which also depends on the public key and cipher parameters). The
most prominent example of an asymmetric block cipher is the RSA cipher [64].
The AsymmetricBlockCipher FlexiAPI engine performs length checking of the
plaintexts and ciphertexts and throws an exception if the lengths are invalid.
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Asymmetric hybrid ciphers
Asymmetric hybrid ciphers are asymmetric ciphers which are capable of encrypt-
ing plaintexts of arbitrary size. Usually, these ciphers internally use a symmetric
block cipher for encrypting. An example of an asymmetric hybrid cipher is the
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption System (ECIES) [39]. Asymmetric hybrid
ciphers are provided by the FlexiAPI via the AsymmetricHybridCipher engine.1
Other ciphers
Ciphers which do not ﬁt in one of the above categories are supported by the
FlexiAPI via the Cipher engine. An example for such a cipher is the password-
based encryption (PBE) scheme deﬁned in PKCS #5 [63]. PBE is a symmetric
cipher which internally uses a block cipher and derives a key for this block
cipher from a password, using a key derivation function. Block ciphers and key
derivation functions are directly supported by the FlexiAPI (see Sections 6.2.2
and 6.2.1).
6.2.3 Algorithm registration and instantiation
The FlexiAPI provides a registration mechanism which guarantees at compile
time that registered classes exist. When registering an algorithm, it is guaran-
teed at runtime that the registered class is of the correct type. The FlexiAPI
does not use a provider concept, but instead provides the Registry class as a
central entity for the registration and instantiation of algorithms.
Algorithm registration
For registering an algorithm, one of the following public static methods of
the Registry class is used:
void add(int type, Class algClass, String algName)
void add(int type, Class algClass, String[] algNames)
The type argument indicates the engine type of the registered algorithm. The
Registry class contains predeﬁned constants for all supported cryptographic
services (e.g. BLOCK_CIPHER, SIGNATURE, and KEY_PAIR_GENERATOR, see Ta-
ble 6.1 for a complete list). The algClass argument speciﬁes the class imple-
menting the algorithm. The ﬁrst method is used to assign a single name to
the registered algorithm, whereas the second method is used to assign multiple
names at once.
Since algorithm classes are registered, it is guaranteed that the classes exist
at compile time. At runtime, the registration mechanism checks whether the
registered class matches the speciﬁed engine type (via the isassignablefrom
operator). If the check fails, a RuntimeException is thrown.
1Asymmetric hybrid ciphers are diﬀerent from hybrid encryption schemes, which combine
an asymmetric block cipher and a symmetric block cipher. The symmetric cipher is used for
data encryption, whereas the asymmetric cipher is used to encrypt the key for the symmetric
cipher.
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Algorithm instantiation
All algorithms are instantiated either by name via the Registry or directly via
the new operator. For each engine type, the Registry provides a factory method
of the following form:
public <type> get<TypeName>(String algName).
<TypeName> denotes the desired engine type, <type> speciﬁes the engine class
providing the corresponding functionality, and algName is the name of the algo-
rithm. If no algorithm of the speciﬁed type is registered under the given name,
a NoSuchAlgorithmException is thrown. Alternatively, each algorithm can be
instantiated directly with the new operator if the implementing class is known.
As an example, suppose that the message digest SHA-1 [54] is implemented
by the class SHA-1. After registering the message digest via
Registry.add(Registry.MESSAGE_DIGEST, SHA-1.class, "SHA-1"),
it can be instantiated with
MessageDigest sha1 = Registry.getMessageDigest("SHA-1"),
or with
MessageDigest sha1 = new SHA-1().
Both instances are used via the MessageDigest engine class.
When instantiating block ciphers, a mode and padding scheme can option-
ally be speciﬁed. The algorithm name is of the form cipher or cipher/mode/
padding. In the ﬁrst case, the block cipher is instantiated in the same way
as described above, and the mode and padding scheme are set at a later time
(see Section 6.2.2). In the latter case, the registration mechanism sets the spec-
iﬁed mode and padding scheme itself. If the speciﬁed mode is not registered, a
NoSuchModeException is thrown. If the speciﬁed padding scheme is not regis-
tered, a NoSuchPaddingException is thrown.
To obtain all registered algorithms of a certain type, the public static
method
Enumeration getAlgorithms(int type)
is used, where the type argument indicates the engine type (see above). The re-
turn type is an Enumeration containing the names (as Strings) of all registered
algorithms of the speciﬁed type.
All registered names of a certain algorithm and type are obtained with the
Vector getNames(int type, String algName)
method, where type denotes the engine type and algName is one of the names
of the algorithm. The return type is a Vector containing all names (as Strings)
of the speciﬁed algorithm and type.
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6.2.4 Parameter speciﬁcation and registration
The FlexiAPI supports the registration and instantiation of predeﬁned param-
eter sets and allows for the assignment of such parameter sets to cryptographic
algorithms. Each parameter set has to be implemented in its own class which
has to provide the default constructor for instantiating the parameter set (see
below for an example). A parameter set is registered with a call to
Registry.add(Registry.ALG_PARAM_SPEC, <pClass>, <pName>),
where <pClass> is the class implementing the parameter set and <pName> is the
name of the parameter set. To assign (a set of) predeﬁned parameter sets to (a
set of) cryptographic algorithms, the public static method
void addStandardAlgParams(String[] algNames,
String[] paramNames)
of the Registry class is used. The paramNames argument is an array of the
names of the predeﬁned parameter sets to be assigned. It is not checked whether
predeﬁned parameter sets are actually registered under these names. The al-
gNames argument is an array of the names of the algorithms the parameter sets
are assigned to.
To obtain the parameter sets assigned to an algorithm, the public static
method
Vector getStandardAlgParams(String algName)
of the Registry class is used. The algName argument denotes the name of the
algorithm. The return type is a Vector containing the names (as Strings) of all
predeﬁned parameter sets for this algorithm, or null if no predeﬁned parameter
sets are registered for the algorithm.
Standardized algorithm parameters example.
Consider the standardized elliptic curve domain parameters prime192v1 deﬁned
by ANSI X9.62 ([2], Appendix J.5.1). The parameters are deﬁned as follows:
OID of the parameter set:
1.2.840.10045.3.1.1
Prime p generating the ﬁeld Fp:
ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe ffffffff ffffffff
Curve coeﬃcient a:
ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe ffffffff fffffffc
Curve coeﬃcient b:
64210519 e59c80e7 0fa7e9ab 72243049 feb8deec c146b9b1
Encoded basepoint G (with point compression):
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03 188da80e b03090f6 7cbf20eb 43a18800 f4ff0afd 82ff1012
Order of basepoint G:
ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 99def836 146bc9b1 b4d22831
Cofactor k:
01
We show how this parameter set can be used with the FlexiAPI. Suppose
that a cryptographic library supporting elliptic curve domain parameters over
prime ﬁelds provides a CurveParamsGFP class. This class has to implement the
AlgorithmParameterSpec interface of the FlexiAPI. Suppose further that the
CurveParamsGFP class has a constructor accepting String representations of the
domain parameters. Then, the prime192v1 parameter set can be implemented
as follows:
public class Prime192v1 extends CurveParamsGFP
/**
* Default constructor.
*/
public Prime192v1() {
super(
// OID
"1.2.840.10045.3.1.1",
// prime p
"ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe ffffffff ffffffff",
// curve coefficient a
"ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe ffffffff fffffffc",
// curve coefficient b
"64210519 e59c80e7 0fa7e9ab 72243049 feb8deec c146b9b1",
// basepoint G
"03 188da80e b03090f6 7cbf20eb
43a18800 f4ff0afd 82ff1012",
// order of basepoint G
"ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 99def836 146bc9b1 b4d22831",
// cofactor k
"01");
}
}
After the Prime192v1 class has been registered with a call to
Registry.add(Registry.ALG_PARAM_SPEC, Prime192v1.class,
new String[] {"prime192v1", "1.2.840.10045.3.1.1"}),
an instance of the parameters is obtained with a call to
AlgorithmParameterSpec prime192v1 =
Registry.getAlgParamSpec("prime192v1")
68
Chapter 6. A ﬂexible API for cryptographic services
or
AlgorithmParameterSpec prime192v1 =
Registry.getAlgParamSpec("1.2.840.10045.3.1.1").
6.2.5 JCA compatibility
As noted above, the FlexiAPI is fully compatible with the JCA on the Java SE
platform. In this section, we brieﬂy describe how this compatibility is achieved.
On the Java SE platform, the FlexiAPI engine classes extend the SPI en-
gine classes of the JCA. Algorithms implementing the FlexiAPI engines are
registered in a JCA Provider class in addition to the registration via the Flexi-
API Registry class. In this way, it is possible to instantiate the algorithms via
the JCA.
The FlexiAPI key classes (PublicKey, PrivateKey, and SecretKey), the
AlgorithmParameterSpec class, and all exceptions thrown by the FlexiAPI en-
gines also extend the corresponding JCA classes. It is thus possible to use
instances of these classes as arguments of the methods of both the JCA and
FlexiAPI engines.
The methods of the JCA SPI engines are implemented by the FlexiAPI
engine classes. They check whether their arguments are FlexiAPI objects and
delegate them to the FlexiAPI methods if possible. Otherwise, they throw an
exception compatible with the JCA interfaces.
For some algorithms (e.g. RSA), the JCA provides interfaces tailored speciﬁ-
cally for these algorithms (e.g. RSAPublicKey). The FlexiAPI also provides such
interfaces. A translation layer between the FlexiAPI engines and algorithm im-
plementations is used to translate between the algorithm-speciﬁc interfaces of
the JCA and FlexiAPI.
6.3 Comparison and evaluation
In this section, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of the FlexiAPI and
the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA).
Supported platforms
The JCA is part of the Java Standard Edition (SE) platform. It is not available
on the Java Micro Edition (ME) platform, which is the platform supported by
resource-constrained devices like mobile phones and PDAs. The FlexiAPI is
available on both the Java SE and Java ME platforms. The Java SE version of
the FlexiAPI is fully compatible with the JCA.
Supported cryptographic services
The FlexiAPI supports all cryptographic services provided by the JCA. In addi-
tion, it oﬀers services not supported by the JCA such as key derivation functions.
Also, the FlexiAPI accounts for the conceptual diﬀerences of diﬀerent types of
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ciphers. In addition to a generic cipher engine, it provides specialized engines
for symmetric block ciphers, asymmetric block ciphers, and asymmetric hybrid
ciphers. This specialization is not supported by the JCA. Furthermore, the
FlexiAPI supports the registration and instantiation of predeﬁned parameter
sets for cryptographic algorithms (see Section 6.2.4 for an example).
Support for diﬀerent implementations
The provider concept of the JCA allows to provide applications with diﬀerent
implementations of the same algorithm. Since the FlexiAPI is not based on a
provider concept, it is not possible to use diﬀerent implementations of the same
algorithm via the FlexiAPI. If an application does not specify which implemen-
tation to use, the JCA decides which implementation is provided based on the
priority of available providers. The FlexiAPI always provides the implementa-
tion of a cryptographic service which is registered last.
However, applications should not depend on speciﬁc implementations of
cryptographic services. For example, the Java Security Manual [75] explic-
itly states this recommendation. The registration mechanism of the FlexiAPI
is adequate for applications following the recommendation. So, the lack of the
support for diﬀerent implementations is only a minor drawback of the FlexiAPI.
Code signatures
Unlike the JCA, the FlexiAPI does not provide built-in support for the veriﬁ-
cation of code signatures of cryptographic libraries. So, these code signatures
currently have to be veriﬁed by an external application. The built-in code sig-
nature support is planned as a future extension of the FlexiAPI.
For the support to be meaningful, reference implementations of the digital
signature algorithms used for the code signature veriﬁcation have to be devel-
oped and evaluated. The FlexiProvider library [22] may serve as a source for
such a reference implementation.
6.4 Applications
The FlexiProvider [22] is a large cryptographic library which fully conforms to
the FlexiAPI. In this section, we give timings of selected cryptographic algo-
rithms provided by this library obtained on a mobile phone. We also describe
a full-ﬂedged application using the FlexiProvider via the FlexiAPI.
6.4.1 Timings of cryptographic algorithms on a mobile phone
Timings are given for the following three digital signature algorithms: DSA ac-
cording to FIPS 186-2 [53], ECDSA according to IEEE 1363 [39], and CMSS ([8],
see also Chapter 3). Also, timings for the following three encryption algorithms
are given: RSA according to PKCS #1 v1.5 [64], NTRUSVES according to
IEEE P1363.1 ([35], see also Chapter 4), and the McEliece Kobara-Imai PKCS
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([20], see also Chapter 5). For all algorithms, parameters are chosen to provide
a security level of 80 bits. The timings are summarized in Table 6.2.
Signature algorithm tsign tverify
DSA 370 ms 390 ms
ECDSA 540 ms 700 ms
CMSS 1040 ms 240 ms
Encryption algorithm tencrypt tdecrypt
RSA 30 ms 880 ms
NTRUSVES 24 ms 27 ms
McEliece 110 ms 630 ms
Table 6.2: Timings of cryptographic algorithms on a mobile phone
Although the performance of the algorithms on a mobile phone is substan-
tially lower than the performance on a desktop PC, it is already suﬃcient for
real applications. Also, mobile devices are getting more and more powerful, so
the performance of the algorithms on these devices will increase in the future.
6.4.2 JCrypTool
The CrypTool [15] is a well-known E-Learning tool for cryptographic algorithms.
JCrypTool [42], a Java port of CrypTool, is currently under development. It
will integrate the FlexiProvider [22] as its source for cryptographic algorithms.
JCrypTool uses the FlexiAPI described in this chapter to provide interfaces to
all algorithms contained in the FlexiProvider library, including full parametriza-
tion of the algorithms. It also allows for the ﬂexible integration of other cryp-
tographic libraries which conform to the FlexiAPI.
71
72
Chapter 7
Conclusion and outlook
In [79], quantum interactive proof systems and the quantum zero-knowledge
property against honest veriﬁers were ﬁrst deﬁned. In [81], the general deﬁnition
of the quantum zero-knowledge property was given, using a more modern quan-
tum formalism. In the paper, it is shown that certain classical zero-knowledge
proof systems (such as the one for the Graph Isomorphism problem) also are
zero-knowledge against quantum veriﬁers. In this thesis, we proved the ro-
bustness of the quantum statistical, perfect, and computational zero-knowledge
properties under sequential composition of interactive proof systems. This ro-
bustness is important since sequential composition is used to reduce the com-
pleteness and soundness errors of interactive proof systems, and when zero-
knowledge proof systems are used as sub-protocols in larger cryptographic pro-
tocols. Thus, the quantum zero-knowledge property of interactive proof systems
is investigated thoroughly.
However, little is known about quantum security models for other cryp-
tographic primitives like digital signatures or public-key encryption schemes.
The established classical security models are security against adaptive chosen-
message attacks for digital signatures, and security against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks for public-key encryption schemes. There currently exist no
quantum analogues for these security models.
In [57], Okamoto et al. propose to obtain quantum security models by sim-
ply replacing classical Turing machines (or classical circuits) by quantum Turing
machines (or quantum circuits) in the classical deﬁnitions. In the case of the
quantum zero-knowledge property, this straightforward approach had to be re-
ﬁned to account for the conceptual diﬀerences between classical and quantum
Turing machines and circuits. When adopting other classical security models ac-
cording to Okamoto et al.'s proposal, similar diﬃculties may be encountered. In
any case, properties and interdependencies of the new quantum security models
have to be studied.
On the practical level, the situation is better. This thesis provides implemen-
tations of the most important quantum-immune cryptosystems. The implemen-
tations are very eﬃcient and easily integrate into existing public-key infrastruc-
tures. Using the new cryptographic API described in Chapter 6, the cryptosys-
tems can also be used with resource-constrained devices. Hence, these alterna-
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tive cryptosystems are already suitable for replacing the established public-key
cryptosystems.
As noted above, no quantum security models exist for digital signatures and
public-key encryption. Consequently, the security of these alternative cryptosys-
tems against quantum computer attacks has not been proven yet. However, the
security of the alternative cryptosystems relies on problems that are expected
to be intractable even for quantum computers [6].
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